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The principal torts decisions this Survey year, especially in the
products liability area, seemed to leave as many questions unan-
swered as they resolved. The Court of Appeals held that a noncon-
tracting user's claim for injuries from a defective product sounded
in tort for limitations purposes,1 but the Court did not decide what
limitation period would be applicable if a statutory breach of war-
ranty claim were also asserted. The contributory negligence defense
to a strict products liability claim was upheld by a reference to the
appellate division's opinion in a second-collision case.2 The analyti-
cally suspect "sales"-"service" distinction was reaffirmed in an
enigmatic opinion by the Court.' And the "abnormally dangerous
activity" formulation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was
cited favorably in an opinion which appeared to give no weight at
all to the context in which the activity was being conducted.4 Else-
where, the appellate divisions gave little encouragement to mal-
practice "countersuits";5 a well-publicized, but questionable, deci-
sion of the Second Circuit further extended first amendment protec-
tions to the media by barring pretrial discovery of "New York Times
malice";6 and the United States Supreme Court may have opened
the floodgates by withdrawing municipalities' immunity from sec-
tion 1983 suits. 7
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research and editorial assistance of William Ruane, Fordham Law School Class of
1980.
1. Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185
(1978); see pp. 556-58 & notes 15-27 infra.
2. See Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914, 405 N.Y.S.2d
441 (1978) (per curiam), aff'g 58 A.D.2d 336, 396 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1st Dep't 1977); pp. 564-67
& notes 56-74 infra.
3. Milau v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882
(1977); see pp. 573-74 & notes 109-19 infra.
4. See Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440,368 N.E.2d 24,398 N.Y.S.2d
401 (1977), rev'g 51 A.D.2d 302, 381 N.Y.S.2d 287 (2d Dep't 1976); pp. 577-80 & notes 132-50
infra.
5. See pp. 583-84 & notes 174-82 infra.
6. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 922 (1978); see
pp. 594-96 & notes 249-68 infra.
7. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); pp. 602-05 & notes
308-36 infra.




1. Theories of Recovery
The problem of the applicable theory or theories under which
persons suffering injuries from defective products can recover has
perennially bedevilled New York courts and lawyers. The early
cases that allowed recovery without proof of negligence were prem-
ised on breach of warranty theories, which, as befits "contractual"
liability, required privity between the injured plaintiff and the de-
fendant The expanded availability of strict liability in product
cases was based upon relaxation of the privity concept in favor of
noncontracting users9 and against noncontracting manufacturers. 0
Although similar developments in other states led to an explicit
recognition that tort remedies were being provided," the New York
courts continued to characterize the products claim made without
allegations of negligence as a contractual cause of action for breach
of warranty. 2 It was only in Codling v. Paglia, 3 when an action was
brought by a complete stranger to the product's chain of privity,
that the "warranty" characterization became too far removed from
reality and the Court of Appeals recognized a claim for "strict prod-
ucts liability."14
Martin v. Julius Dierck Equipment Co.15 is the latest case de-
cided by the Court of Appeals in which the plaintiff attempted to
exploit a difference between strict products liability and breach of
warranty theories. A majority of the divided Court held that the
plaintiff, who was not in privity with the defendants manufacturer
and distributor, could not rely on New York's four-year statute of
8. E.g., Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 74, 161 N.E. 423, 424 (1928).
9. E.g., Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
10. E.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181
N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
11. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 287, 216 A.2d 189, 191 (1965);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 617, 210 N.E.2d 182, 185 (1965); see RBSTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
12. E.g., Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 344, 253 N.E.2d 207, 209,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (1969); see note 35 infra.
13. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
14. Id. at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70.
15. 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978).
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limitations for breach of warranty."
The plaintiff in Martin, a resident of the District of Columbia,
had been injured in Virginia on June 7, 1968, when a forklift truck
he was operating malfunctioned and threw him to the ground. The
truck had been sold on June 26, 1967, by the defendant manufac-
turer to the plaintiff's employer through the defendant distributor,
whose principal place of business was in New York. 7
The plaintiff commenced his actions against the two defen-
dants on May 21 and June 25, 1971, alleging negligence and breach
of warranty. The defendants moved for summary judgment, con-
tending that under the New York "borrowing statute," CPLR 202,18
the New York courts must apply the two-year Virginia statute of
limitations" and that, because the action accrued in Virginia on
May 6, 1969, the action was barred.s
The trial court held that the negligence cause of action accrued
in Virginia and was therefore barred, but also concluded that the
breach of warranty action accrued in New York, thus making the
breach of warranty claim timely under New York's four-year statute
of limitations for breach of warranty actions.2' The appellate divi-
sion reversed and granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, holding that the breach of warranty claim, as well as the
negligence claim, accrued in Virginia, the forum with the greatest
interest in the litigation.2
16. Id. at 588, 374 N.E.2d at 99, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
17. Id. at 587, 374 N.E.2d at 98, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
18. N.Y. CPLR 202 (McKinney 1972) provides:
An action based upon a cause of action accruirig without the state cannot be comm-
enced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of either the state or the
place without the state where the cause of action accrued, except that where the
cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the state the time limited by the laws
of the state shall apply.
19. VA. CODE § 8.01-243(A) (1977) provides: "[E]very action for personal injuries, what-
ever the theory of recovery, .... shall be brought within two years next after the cause of
action shall have accrued."
20. 43 N.Y.2d at 587, 374 N.E.2d at 98, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
21. Id. at 587, 374 N.E.2d at 98-99, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 187; see N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725
(McKinney 1964). The trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment in
its entirety, on the ground that factual issues existed as to whether Virginia's statute of
limitations was tolled by the plaintiff's unsuccessful efforts to obtain jurisdiction over the
defendants in Virginia. 43 N.Y.2d at 587-88, 374 N.E.2d at 99, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 187. The
appellate division found no question of fact on the jurisdictional issue, 52 A.D.2d 463, 468-
69, 384 N.Y.S.2d 479, 483-84 (2d Dep't 1976), and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 43 N.Y.2d
at 592, 374 N.E.2d at 101-02, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
22. Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 52 A.D.2d 463, 466-67, 384 N.Y.S.2d 479, 482
(2d Dep't 1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978).
1979] Torts
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Judge Jasen, writing for the Court of Appeals, said at the outset
that before CPLR 202 could be applied, it was necessary to charac-
terize the plaintiff's cause of action to determine where it had ac-
crued." While the plaintiff's second cause of action was denomi-
nated as a breach of warranty claim, the Court said that it was in
reality a strict products liability action.24 Breach of warranty is a
contractual remedy which seeks to provide the parties with the ben-
efit of their bargain; 21 strict products liability, on the other hand,
seeks to make whole a party who has been injured by another per-
son's violation of a duty imposed by law.26 An injured person not in
privity with the seller, therefore, does not possess a breach of war-
ranty action, but an action in negligence or strict products liabil-
ity.2" As a result, the plaintiff's claim accrued in Virginia, where the
injury occurred, and was barred by the Virginia statute of limita-
tions.
The decision in Martin denying the breach of warranty theory
is an appropriate culmination to the evolutionary process by which
strict products liability has replaced breach of implied warranty in
non-privity situations.8 In the development of products liability law
it was at one time advantageous to speak in terms of breach of
warranty because that theory allowed recovery without proof of
fault, while the then-existing tort doctrine did not. However, breach
of warranty, with its basis in contract, 29 was stretched to the break-
23. 43 N.Y.2d at 589, 374 N.E.2d at 99, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
24. Id. (citing Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 401-02, 335 N.E.2d
275, 277-78, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41-42 (1975)).
25. Id. at 589, 374 N.E.2d at 99-100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188 (citing Victorson v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 401, 335 N.E.2d 275, 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41 (1975);
Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and
Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. Rzv. 123, 127 (1974)).
26. Id. at 589, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188 (citing Victorson v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 401, 335 N.E.2d 275, 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41 (1975); W. PROSSER,
LAw OF TORTS § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971); Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement
of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. Rav. 123, 127
(1974)).
27. 43 N.Y.2d at 589, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
28. See generally Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 401, 335 N.E.2d
275, 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1975); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Dickey v. Lockport Prestress, Inc., 52 A.D.2d 1075, 1076, 384 N.Y.S.2d
609, 610 (4th Dep't 1976).
29. As a historical matter, warranty has been identified with both tort and contract law.
See Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 402 & n.2, 335 N.E.2d 275, 278 &
n.2, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 & n.2 (1975). However, in this century the doctrine has been clearly
associated with contract and sales law. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 655 (4th ed.
1971).
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19791 Torts
ing point in cases such as Codling where claims were made by by-
standers completely outside the chain of privity. Therefore, the
Court not only adopted new terminology-strict products liabil-
ity-but also gave explicit recognition to the development in tort
doctrine which had been going on under the breach of warranty
label.3e Bluntly stated, after Codling the breach of warranty theory
had outlived its usefulness in claims for personal injuries for defec-
tive products; in Martin, the Court appropriately returned the
theory to its place in contract law.
Despite statements in recent cases that either the breach of
warranty or the strict products liability theory may be available,
depending on the factual context,"1 it is clear that for noncontracting
users or bystanders the theories are identical in all respects save the
statute of limitations. As defined by the courts, the breach of war-
ranty theory affords the plaintiff no advantage-in the elements of
the cause of action, ' the possible defendants, 3 or the applicable
defenses 3"-which he could not obtain by suing for strict products
liability. The identity of the causes of action, and the unreasona-
bleness of maintaining two separate statutes of limitations therefor,
was recognized by Judge Scileppi in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. :
30. See Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 401-02, 335 N.E.2d 275,
277, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1975).
31. Id. at 400, 335 N.E.2d at 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 41 (1975); accord, Micallef v. Miehle
Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 382, 348 N.E.2d 571, 575, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 119 (1976); Ribley v. Harsco
Corp., 57 A.D.2d 234, 235-36, 394 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (3d Dep't 1977); Murphy v. General
Motors Corp., 55 A.D.2d 486, 488, 391 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (3d Dep't 1977); Dickey v. Lockport
Prestress, Inc., 52 A.D.2d 1075, 1076, 384 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (4th Dep't 1976); Powell v. Gates-
Chili Cent. School Dist., 50 A.D.2d 1079, 1080, 376 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (4th Dep't 1975).
32. See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 337-38, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 625, 628-29, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 465, 470 (1973); cf. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376,387, 348 N.E.2d 571,
578-79, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 122 (1976) (cause of action for breach of implied warranty "is more
correctly treated under the theory of strict products liability").
33. See Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Co., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 121, 305 N.E.2d 750, 752,
350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (1973) (imposing liability on supplier); Mead v. Warner Pruyn Div.,
Finch Pruyn Sales, Inc., 57 A.D.2d 340, 344, 394 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (3d Dep't 1977) (imposing
liability on retail vendor).
34. See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387, 348 N.E.2d 571, 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115, 122 (1976) (contributory fault); Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Co., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 123,
124-25, 305 N.E.2d 750, 753, 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 621-22, 622-23 (1973) (contributory fault,
disclaimers); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 343-44, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 629, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-71 (1973) (contributory fault).
35. 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969). The Court's selection in
Mendel of the warranty limitation period was overruled in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Ma-
chine Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 400, 335 N.E.2d 275, 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (1975).
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We would merely add that both parties appear to agree, and we
believe correctly, that strict liability in tort and implied warranty
in the absence of privity are merely different ways of describing the
very same cause of action. If we were to adopt a three-year limita-
tions period from the time of the injury, then we would create a
situation where at least those plaintiffs not in privity covered by
section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, would be entitled
to pick and choose between the code's four-year-from-the-time-of-
the-sale, and our three-year-from-the-time-of-the-injury, limita-
tions period, depending upon which, under the facts of a given case,
would grant them the longest period of time to sue. Although it is
true that a plaintiff may have two different theories of recovery
involving the same wrong with different limitation periods (e.g.,
negligence and breach of warranty), it would be absurd to have two
different periods of limitation applicable to the same cause of ac-
tion, with the same elements of proof, complaining of the very same
wrong.38
Unfortunately, the absurdity of which Judge Scileppi spoke
may be an unavoidable consequence of the Legislature's 1975
amendment of UCC section 2-318, which expanded the third-party
beneficiaries of sales contract warranties from the buyer, his family,
members of his household, and his guests to "any natural person if
it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. '37 Since the injuries to the plaintiff in Martin occurred in
1969, the majority and the dissent agreed that he could not claim
the benefit of a breach of warranty action based on the statute.3
However, the dissent believed that the Legislature, by its amend-
ment of section 2-318, had ratified the trend in the cases toward
36. 25 N.Y.2d at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95. It should be noted that
Judge Scileppi was not speaking of a situation in which distinguishable theories of recovery
are available for a single injury. In such a situation, the Court of Appeals has said, "the
Legislature may, if it chooses, impose one period of limitation for a cause of action to recover
damages for a personal injury arising from negligence and different periods of limitation for
a cause of action for the same injury where liability may arise on other grounds . .. ."
Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 299, 200 N.E. 824, 826 (1936).
However, the decision this Survey year in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Associates, 43 N.Y.2d
389, 394-95, 372 N.E.2d 555, 557, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 770 (1977), suggests that the nature of
the remedy, not the theory of liability, will now determine the statute of limitations. See
McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 179 N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
37. Compare 1962 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 553, § 2-318 with N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney
Supp. 1978).
38. See 43 N.Y.2d at 591, 374 N.E.2d at 101, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 189; id. at 595, 374 N.E.2d
at 103, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
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eliminating any privity requirement; therefore, "[i]t would seem
rather incongruous at this late date for this court to act to recon-
struct those very barriers which we have previously dismantled...
and at a time when the Legislature has enunciated public policy and
has so plainly indicated its approval of the direction of our earlier
decisions. '"" The majority, on the other hand, chiose to postpone
considering the effect of the amended statute, "except to note the
likelihood of disagreement as to its effect should a case arise in
which its applicability may properly be considered." 0
The majority has few options in trying to limit the application
of the statutory breach of warranty cause of action and thus avoid
two statutes of limitations for essentially identical claims.4' The
amendment to section 2-318 clearly makes unavailable, to causes of
action accruing on or after September 1, 1975,42 the argument from
Martin that breach of warranty requires privity of contract. Nor can
the Court use the argument suggested by the decision this Survey
year in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Associates,4 3 that damages for
personal injury do not constitute a contract remedy, and thus the
tort statute of limitations must apply.44 UCC section 2-715(2)(b)
explicitly states that "[clonsequential damages resulting from a
seller's breach include. . injury to person or property proximately
resulting from any breach of warranty."4
39. Id. at 595, 374 N.E.2d at 104, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 192 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
40. Id. at 591, 374 N.E.2d at 101, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
41. A third limitations period, four years from the date of injury, might be argued for
on the basis of N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (McKinney 1964), which provides that, if the warranty"explicitly extends to future performance," a cause of action for breach of warranty accrues
when the breach is or should be discovered. Use of the word "explicitly" might suggest that
the warranty of future performance need not be "express," so that the implied warranties of
merchantability could extend to future performance. See D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS
LuIuTY IN A NUTrsHE.L 333 (1974); Donnelly & Donnelly, Commercial Law, 1977 Survey of
N.Y Law, 29 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 327, 333 n.36 (1978); Phillips, AnAnalysis of Proposed Reform
of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. Rav. 663, 669 (1978). However, the
better view is that a warranty does not extend to future performance unless it is express or
clearly implied in the parties' dealings. See Thalrose v. General Motors Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1257 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1971), aff'd mem., 41 A.D.2d 906, 343 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1st Dep't
1973); cf. Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 573, 574, 344 N.Y.S.2d 101,
103 (2d Dep't 1973) (prospective warranty when manufacturers issued "certificate of assur-
ance" that burial vault "will give satisfactory service at all times").
42. See 1975 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 774, § 1.
43. 43 N.Y.2d 389, 395, 372 N.E.2d 555, 557, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 770 (1977).
44. See Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 590, 374 N.E.2d 97, 100, 403
N.Y.S.2d 185, 188-89 (1978).
45. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (McKinney 1964).
1979] Torts
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The best approach to the dual-limitations problem, though one
far from unassailable, seems to be that suggested by Judge Fuchs-
berg in his concurring opinion in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Ma-
chine Co. :46 the statute of limitations prescribed in UCC section 2-
72517 is intended only to govern commercial transactions.4s As he
noted:
[A] careful reading of section 2-725 of the code (or the comments
to it), where the four-year-from-time-of-delivery limitation is set
out, points up the complete absence of references to personal injury
and third-party beneficiary actions. The inference is that the intent
was to deal exclusively with commercial transactions. Expressed in
the drafter's own statement of statutory purpose, the aim was: "To
introduce a uniform statute of limitations for sales contracts, thus
eliminating the jurisdictional variations and providing needed relief
for concerns doing business on a nationwide scale whose contracts
have heretofore been governed by several different periods of limita-
tion depending upon the state in which the transaction occurred.
This Article takes sales contracts out of the general laws limiting the
time for commencing contractual actions and selects a four year
period as the most appropriate to modern business practice. This is
within the normal commercial record keeping period.""
46. 37 N.Y.2d 395, 404, 335 N.E.2d 275, 280, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 45 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J.,
concurring).
47. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964).
48. 37 N.Y.2d at 407-08, 335 N.E.2d at 281-82, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 47-48 (Fuchsberg, J.,
concurring). Judge Fuchsberg, who dissented in Martin, would probably contend that he was
speaking in Victorson in the context of unamended U.C.C. section 2-318 and a plaintiff who
would benefit by application of the tort limitation period. However, his Victorson opinion
defined the problem he was addressing and explicitly stated the conclusion argued for here,
in the following terms:
But a future choice between the Statute of Limitations provisions of the code and
that of tort law will be unavoidable in cases of consumer plaintiffs who come within
the compass of the code, though I take leave to venture the opinion that the choice
of the tort rule for all persons injured in such cases would both appear to partake of
the virtues of simplicity and equality of application, and to be the logical end-product
of the legal evolution hereinafter discussed.
Id. at 405, 335 N.E.2d at 280, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 45. During this Survey year the Second
Department rejected an argument that U.C.C. section 2-725 did not apply to a breach of
warranty action for personal injuries from a defective drug on the ground, inter alia, that the
other members of the Court in Victorson did not join in Judge Fuchsberg's concurring opinion.
McCarthy v. Bristol Laboratories, 61 A.D.2d 196, 200-01, 401 N.Y.S.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Dep't
1978). Of course, the majority in Victorson could quite reasonably have decided not to join
in an opinion which was concededly addressing an issue not then before the Court.
49. 37 N.Y.2d at 407-08, 335 N.E.2d at 281-82, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 47-48 (Fuchsberg, J.,
concurring) (quoting N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725, Official Comment (McKinney 1964)) (emphasis
supplied).
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Such an approach would permit a single statute of limitations in
non-privity cases. In Victorson the Court justified its choice of the
tort limitations period for strict products liability:
On principle, there having been no prior relationship between
the parties in strict products liability cases, the cause of action if
any there be, should accrue at the time the injury is sustained. To
hold that it somehow came into being prior thereto would defy both
logic and experience ...
Then over how long a period thereafter should the injured party
be allowed to assert his claim? As in other instances in which periods
of limitation must be fixed, the answer depends on a nice balancing
of policy considerations.. . .We identify no material factors which
suggest that the period of limitation should be different where it is
sought to impose liability on the manufacturer on the theory of strict
products liability rather than on the theory of negligence. Substan-
tially similar considerations are equally cogent and persuasive.50
The only question remaining is what the Legislature was trying
to do when it amended UCC section 2-318. If it was attempting to
codify Codling,51 the result was not just unnecessary; it also missed
the point of the Court's shift from "breach of warranty" to "strict
products liability" terminology and, in so doing, suggested a dis-
tinction that the Court has not been willing to recognize. If it was
attempting to give plaintiffs alternative statutes of limitations for
products injuries, the intention was opaque and the result extremely
difficult to justify. Unless the Legislature had some other, indiscern-
able purpose in mind, the better course would be to repeal the now-
redundant Code provisions which give noncontracting consumers
warranty remedies for personal injuries.
2. Contributory Negligence Defense
When the Court of Appeals recognized the cause of action for
strict products liability in Codling v. Paglia,52 it also ruled that fault
by the plaintiff-by virtue of his use of the product, in failing to
discover the defect and perceive its danger, or in contributing to his
injuries independently of the defect-was a defense to the cause of
50. Id. at 403-04, 335 N.E.2d at 278-79, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 43-44.
51. This is the most likely possibility inferable from the bill jacket materials accompany-
ing the amending statute, 1975 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 774. There was no Governor's memoran-
dum or other legislative document accompanying the Act.
52. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1973).
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action.53 That position is more stringent than that which is taken
elsewhere. For example, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
a plaintiffs claim is not barred for failure to discover a defect or to
guard against its existence, but only for voluntarily and unreasona-
bly acting in the face of a known dangerous defect. 4 Nevertheless,
New York's strict position has been reaffirmed several times by the
Court of Appeals. 5 The most recent occasion on which the Court
upheld the contributory negligence defense to strict products liabil-
ity was during this Survey year in the interesting case of Cousins v.
Instrument Flyers, Inc.5"
In Cousins the plaintiff was flying a rented airplane from New
York to Ohio when it ran out of fuel and was forced to land in a field
near Erie, Pennsylvania. During the landing, the plaintiff suffered
injuries which were allegedly made serious because the plane lacked
shoulder harnesses and was otherwise not "crashworthy." 57 In an
action brought against the lessor and the manufacturer of the plane,
the defendants argued that the plaintiffs contributory negligence in
allowing the plane to run out of fuel barred his strict products liabil-
ity claim. A judgment for the defendants was affirmed by the appel-
late division on the grounds that New York law rather than Pennsyl-
vania law applied and that, under New York law, a plaintiff's negli-
gent failure to avert his injuries constitutes a defense to a strict
products liability action."8 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judg-
ment in a per curiam decision which discussed the conflicts issue
and referred to the lower court's opinion regarding contributory neg-
ligence."'
53. Id. at 342, 343-44, 298 N.E.2d at 628-29, 629, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 470, 470-71.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
55. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387-88, 348 N.E.2d 571, 579, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115, 122 (1976) (Cooke & Fuchsberg, J.J., "would prefer to adopt the rule. . .embodied in
section 402A of the Restatement, Torts 2d"); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 159-
60, 305 N.E.2d 769, 773, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 650-51 (1973); Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber
Co., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 123-24, 305 N.E.2d 750, 753, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 621-22 (1973).
56. 44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914, 405 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1978) (per curiam), aff'g 58 A.D.2d
336, 396 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1st Dep't 1977).
57. 58 A.D.2d 336, 338-39, 396 N.Y.S.2d 655, 656 (1st Dep't 1977). The plaintiff had also
alleged that the plane was defective because the instruction manuals did not accurately
describe the plane's fuel-usage characteristics, as a result of which the plane ran out of fuel
and was forced to crash land. See id. at 343, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 659-60 (Capozzoli, J., dissent-
ing).
58. Id. at 338, 339, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 656, 657, noted in Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 1977
Survey of N.Y. Law, 28 SvA.cus- L. REv. 509, 527-29 (1977).
59. 44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914, 405 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1978) (per curiam).
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What makes Cousins interesting" was the attempted use of the
distinction taken in many products liability cases between defects
initially contributing to an accident and those tending only to ag-
gravate injuries once an accident takes place. 1 The plaintiff essen-
tially argued that liability should be determined independently for
the two stages of the accident. The argument was based in part on
the decision in Spier v. Barker, 12 in which the Court of Appeals held
that a plaintiff who unreasonably failed to use a seat belt was not
barred from recovery for injuries suffered in an accident caused by
the defendant's negligence, but the plaintiffs damages would be
reduced by the amount that the negligent failure to use the seat belt
made her injuries more serious than they foreseeably would have
been if she had exercised reasonable care by using the belt. 3 The
plaintiff in Cousins suggested that the Spier reasoning could be used
when the parties were reversed." That is, the plaintiff should be
responsible for the injuries attributable to him alone (i.e., the
threshold injuries), but the defendant should be responsible for
the injuries which would not have occurred but for the "crash-
60. If I were wearing my Conflicts hat I would say that Cousins is also interesting for its
choice-of-law analyses. The appellate division essentially went through a "contacts-counting"
exercise. See 58 A.D.2d at 337-38, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 656. Justice Capozzoli, by contrast,
considered the significance of the various contacts with respect to the issue involved. See 58
A.D.2d at 341-43, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 659 (Capozzoli, J., dissenting). The Court of Appeals
affirmed on some notion of estoppel:
Plaintiff chose to sue in New York, and the parties and the court proceeded,
reasonably, in view of the many relevant factors, assuming that New York law would
apply on the now disputed issue. Only after all the proof had been received and just
before the jury was to be charged did plaintiff's highly experienced counsel suggest
application of Pennsylvania law. Plaintiff had already chosen his strategy, based on
New York law, and it was late to change it after the unfavorable testimony had
unfolded. . . . Hence, it was not error for the Trial Justice to apply New York law,
not only the law of the forum, but the law applicable to significant events in this
multi-State trip by air, in the absence of compelling reason to apply belatedly an-
other law, whether on the doctrine of lex loci delicti or otherwise.
44 N.Y.2d at 700, 376 N.E.2d at 915, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 443. The Court gave no indication how
anyone was prejudiced by this change of positions (which was, incidentally, accompanied by
the defendants' shift from Pennsylvania to New York law as the law to be applied, 58 A.D.2d
at 342, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 659 (Capozzoli, J., dissenting)). Moreover, as Justice Capozzoli noted,
"[nlone of this, however, would excuse the court from the duty of applying the correct law
since the request came prior to the charge to the jury." 58 A.D.2d at 342, 396 N.Y.S.2d at
659 (Capozzoli, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644
(19173).
. 62. 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974).
63. Id. at 449-52, 323 N.E.2d at 167-69, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 920-22.
64. See 58 A.D.2d at 338-39, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 656-57.
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worthiness" defect (i.e., the aggravated injuries). The argument
thus implies a proximate cause analysis: the plaintiff is negligent
because he has created an unreasonable risk of threshold injuries,
not because he has created an unreasonable risk of aggravated
injuries, since aggravated injuries resulting from defective design or
manufacture are not reasonably foreseeable by him. Therefore, even
if the plaintiffs negligent conduct gives rise to the circumstances in
which the "second collision" occurs (i.e., he is a "but-for" cause of
the aggravation injuries), he is cut off from responsibility (i.e., not
a proximate cause) because of the unforeseeable intervention by the
defendant manufacturer."5
The appellate division rejected the plaintiff's argument on the
ground that the Spier reasoning applied only to the question of
mitigation of damages, not to the question of liability." The court
found that Spier bore "no discernible relation" to any theory which
would make inapplicable the condition for a strict products liability
claim set out in Codling, "'that by the exercise of reasonable care
the person injured or damaged would not otherwise have averted his
injury or damages.' "67
In Codling the Court of Appeals adopted the contributory negli-
gence defense to strict liability claims as if the justification were
self-evident. 8 However, further analysis suggests that, at least in
some circumstances, such as in Cousins, the defense is inconsistent
with the rationales announced for the strict products liability
theory 9 and serves no purpose except to limit the manufacturer's
liability.
The heart of the policy argument for the plaintiff in Cousins is
that there is no reason to relieve the defendant manufacturer of
liability in this one situation, since the manufacturer would have
been strictly liable for the plaintiffs aggravated injuries if the acci-
65. See Furukawa v. Yoshi Ogawa, 236 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1956); Twerski, The Use and
Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. Rav. 797, 810 (1977).
66. 58 A.D.2d at 339, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 657; see Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 323
N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920-21 (1974).
67. 58 A.D.2d at 339, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (quoting Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330,
342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 470 (1973)).
68. See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 341-44, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461, 469-71.
69. The rationales suggested in Codling include: induced consumer reliance by attractive
packaging and mass advertising; impracticability of consumers discovering defects; spreading
of costs through mass production and marketing systems; and pressures imposed on manufac-
turers to improve safety. Id. at 340-41, 298 N.E.2d at 627-28, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69.
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dent had resulted from the non-faulty conduct of the plaintiff,
faulty or non-faulty conduct by anyone else, or an Act of God.7"
Permitting the use of the defense in these circumstances has no
deterrent effect. The plaintiff is already deterred, to the extent he
can be, from getting into the accident by the contributory negli-
gence defense applicable to his threshold injuries.71 Application of
the defense cannot further induce him either to use the product only
for its intended purposes,72 which he was already doing, or to dis-
cover the defect,73 which is by definition undiscoverable in the exer-
cise of reasonable care. Furthermore, it is not efficient to put the
cost burden of the aggravated injuries on the plaintiff. The plaintiff
cannot reasonably foresee the defects for which he is suing, but the
defendant can reasonably foresee that the defects will cause aggra-
vated injuries in accidents resulting from both negligent and non-
negligent conduct. Since the manufacturer is thus in a superior
position to avoid the risk, he should bear the costs of the harm.74
In a sense, as Professor Twerski has argued, 75 cases such as
Cousins involve a "last clear chance" situation. After the moment
of the initial collision the plaintiff is helpless, unable to protect
himself against the crashworthiness defect in the product that will
aggravate his injuries. The defendant manufacturer, on the other
hand, knows or has reason to know of the plaintiff's peril, in the
sense that the crashworthiness defect is one which a reasonable
person in the position of the manufacturer would know creates an
unreasonable risk of injury to a person involved in an accident (how-
ever caused) and unable to help himself. Thus, since the manufac-
turer has the last clear chance to avoid the peril of aggravated
second-collision injuries, the plaintiff's contributory negligence in
getting himself into this helpless position should not bar his recov-
ery.
The New York comparative negligence statut 7 was not applic-
70. See Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 159, 305 N.E.2d 769, 773, 350 N.Y.S.2d
644, 650-51 (1973); Twerski, supra note 65, at 809.
71. See Twerski, supra note 65, at 810.
72. See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461,
470 (1973).
73. See id.
74. See Twerski, supra note 65, at 800-02.
75. Id. at 809 & n.38.
76. N.Y. CPLR 1411-1413 (McKinney 1976). N.Y. CPLR 1411 provides:
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or
wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to the decedent,
1979] Torts
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able in Cousins, since the accident occurred before September 1,
1975.17 Even if the cause of action had accrued after that date,
however, the analysis suggested here would lead to the conclusion
that the plaintiffs alleged negligence in running out of fuel should
not have diminished his recovery for the aggravated injuries caused
by the crashworthiness defect. Under the statute, "culpable con-
duct" goes to diminish the recovery when it "cause[s] the dam-
ages";"8 here, the plaintiffs conduct is not a proximate cause of the
aggravated injuries.79 Moreover, the policy of encouraging care on
the part of the manufacturer by holding him liable for crashworthi-
ness defects will be impaired if his liability is diminished by the
foreseeable negligence of the plaintiff, but reduced recovery will
induce no increased care on the plaintiffs part." Thus, the effect of
the comparative negligence statute in a case like Cousins should
only be that the plaintiff will bear the cost of the threshold injuries
attributable to his negligence in causing the occurrence, while the
manufacturer will bear the cost of the aggravated injuries attributa-
ble to the crashworthiness defect.8 '
3. Retail Vendors as Defendants
Three cases decided during this Survey year involved claims
against retail vendors of allegedly defective products. The different
results appear to reflect differences in both the nature of the prod-
including contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery, but
the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion
which the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or decedent bears to the
culpable conduct which caused the damages.
77. N.Y. CPLR 1413 (McKinney 1976); see Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 388
n.3, 348 N.E.2d 571, 579 n.3, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 122 n.3 (1976).
78. N.Y. CPLR 1411 (McKinney 1976); see Occhialino, Comparative Negligence, [19751
N.Y. JUDtCIAL CONF. SPEC. SIX-MONTH REP. 140. But see 1 Nzw YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIoNs-CnIvL PJI 2:36, at 28 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (plaintiffs damages diminished if his negli-
gence "in any material way contributed to causing the occurrence") [hereinafter cited as
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCrIONS].
79. See Krause, Comparative Negligence in New York, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 638, 641, 672
(1975); pp. 565-66 supra.
80. See Twerski, supra note 65, at 809-10; pp. 566-67 supra.
81. N.Y. CPLR 1411 (McKinney 1976) calls for determining "the proportion which the
culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct
which caused the damages." That suggests that relative amounts of fault are to be compared;
the analysis in the text suggests a weighing of relative causal contributions. In the situation
discussed, it seems questionable whether there would be any practical difference, especially
when the jury is told to "determine the percentage of the total negligence which can be
attributed to the negligence" of the claimant. See 1 PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note
78, at 28. See generally Twerski, supra note 65, at 819-29.
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ucts and the functions performed by the respective retailers.
In Mead v. Warner Pruyn Division, Finch Pruyn Sales, Inc.,12
the plaintiff's decedents had died in a fire that was allegedly caused
by defects in a refrigerator sold to the previous owners of their resi-
dence by the defendant retailer. The retailer's motion to dismiss the
claims based on strict products liability and warranty was denied,13
and that decision was affirmed by the Third Department. 4
The defendant in Mead had argued that the cause of action for
strict products liability that was recognized in Codling v. Paglia85
applied only against the manufacturer of a defective product, not
against the retailer who has no control over hidden or latent de-
fects." In rejecting that argument, the appellate division focused on
the retailer's position as an "'integral part of the overall producing
and marketing enterprise .. . "87' The retailer is able to exert
pressure on the manufacturer to improve product safety; he has
induced reliance in the quality of the goods he sells; and he serves
as an accessible defendant ensuring that the costs of defective goods
will not be left on injured consumers but will be imposed on the
enterprise distributing goods to the public. These considerations
are equally applicable whether the theory of the claim is breach of
warranty, for which the Court of Appeals in Greenberg v. Lorenz8
has already allowed recovery against a retailer, or strict products
liability, since "[tihe conclusion is inescapable that 'strict prod-
ucts liability and liability to a remote user based on implied war-
ranty are one and the same cause of action.' ",'
Implicit in the court's reasoning was the assumption that losses
imposed on the retailer can be further shifted to the manufacturer
or other party in the distribution chain responsible for the defect.
The court noted that a retailer can pass on the costs under the
82. 57 A.D.2d 340, 394 N.Y.S.2d 483 (3d Dep't 1977).
83. 87 Misc. 2d 782, 386 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct., Wash. Co. 1976), noted in Commercial
Law, 1977 Survey, supra note 41, at 332-33.
84. 57 A.D.2d 340, 394 N.Y.S.2d 483 (3d Dep't 1977).
85. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 470 (1973).
86. 87 Misc. 2d at 784, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
87. 57 A.D.2d at 341, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 484 (quoting Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61
Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964)).
88. Id. at 341-42, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 484; see Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d
256, 262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRS § 402A, Comment c (1965).
89. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 173 N.E.2d 773, 775-76, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1961).
90. 57 A.D.2d at 343-44, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (quoting Dickey v. Lockport Prestress, Inc.,
52 A.D.2d 1075, 1076, 384 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (4th Dep't 1976)).
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theories of contribution between joint tortfeasors, contractual in-
demnity, and indemnity based on strict products liability." The
court might also have mentioned that a commercial relation such
as that between retailer and distributor or manufacturer may give
rise to express or implied warranties on which rights over could be
based . 2
The Third Department, in Osborn v. Kelley, 3 subsequently
distinguished Mead in an action in which the allegedly defective
product was a drug and the defendants were doctors who prescribed
it. The plaintiffs' breach of warranty claims were dismissed on the
authority of Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital," which held that
no express or implied warranties arise when the product is furnished
as an incidental part of services rendered by the defendant," since
there is no "sale" within the meaning of the Uniform Commerical
Code." The plaintiffs' attempt to assert a strict products liability
claim fared no better. The court acknowledged that in Mead it had
recently imposed liability on retailers under this theory, but rea-
soned in Osborn that physicians "are in a unique position."' 7 Rely-
ing again on PerImutter, the court noted:
"The art of healing frequently calls for a balancing of risks and
dangers to a patient. Consequently, if injury results from the course
adopted, where no negligence or fault is present, liability should not
91. 57 A.D.2d at 344, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 485-86; see Haman v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 34
N.Y.2d 557, 310 N.E.2d 538, 354 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1974) (contractual indemnity); Dole v. Dow
Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972) (contribution among joint
tortfeasors); Infante v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 49 A.D.2d 72, 371 N.Y.S.2d 500 (3d Dep't
1975) (indemnification for strict products liability); N.Y. CPLR 1401 (McKinney 1976) (con-
tribution in claims for personal injury, property damage, and wrongful death). See also Bay
Ridge Air Rights, Inc. v. State, 44 N.Y.2d 49, 53-56, 375 N.E.2d 29, 30-32, 404 N.Y.S.2d 73,
74-76 (1978) (contribution cause of action accrues on date payment made by party seeking
contribution).
92. See McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 137, 2 N.E.2d 513, 515 (1936); Infante v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 49 A.D.2d 72, 74-75, 371 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501-02 (3d Dep't 1975);
N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-714, 2-715 (McKinney 1964). See also Thach v. Grant Donaldson Serv., Inc.,
38 A.D.2d 39, 44-45, 326 N.Y.S.2d 720, 725-26 (4th Dep't 1971) (no indemnity contract
implied in time-barred breach of warranty action).
93. 61 A.D.2d 367, 402 N.Y.S.2d 463 (3d Dep't 1978).
94. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
95. Id. at 104-07, 123 N.E.2d at 793-96.
96. 61 A.D.2d at 369, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 464; see N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314 (McKinney
1964).
97. 61 A.D.2d at 369, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
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be imposed upon the institution or agency actually seeking to save
or otherwise assist the patient."9
The same result was reached by the First Department in
Bichler v. Willing," an action against a pharmacist who had dis-
persed diethylstilbestrol (DES) to the plaintiffs mother. Although
the druggist was the retail vendor of the allegedly defective product,
the court dismissed claims based on breach of implied warranty and
strict products liability. The former theory was rejected because the
buyer had not relied on the skill and judgment of the seller-druggist
to provide a product inherently fit for its intended purpose, but
rather had placed that confidence in the doctor who prescribed the
drug. 1'
In dismissing the claim based on a strict products liability
theory, the court apparently read Comment k to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts as imposing strict liability for drugs
only when they are improperly prepared or insufficient warning is
given of recognized risks.'0 ' Since the retail druggist had no practical
98. Id. (quoting Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 107, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795
(1954)).
99. 58 A.D.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (lst Dep't 1977).
100. Id. at 333-34, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 58-59; see N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-315 (McKinney 1964). In
McCarthy v. Bristol Laboratories, 61 A.D.2d 196, 401 N.Y.S.2d 509 (2d Dep't 1978), the court
held that the four-year U.C.C. limitations period applied to a breach of warranty claim for
personal injuries allegedly caused by a defective drug given to the plaintiff in a hospital. Id.
at 199-200, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 511-12; see N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964). Since the
appeal arose on the denial of the defendants' summary judgment motion, the court did not
reach the question "whether medication given to a patient in a hospital (for which the patient
pays) is 'sold' to the patient or is an aspect of the 'service' rendered to the patient." 61 A.D.2d
at 200, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 512. See also pp. 573-76 & notes 108-28 infra.
101. See 58 A.D.2d at 334-35, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A, Comment k (1965) provides:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies .... Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The
same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very
reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a
physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can
be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experi-
ence as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medi-
cally recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that
they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
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opportunity independently to test the drugs, the court imposed no
duty on him to do so.' °2 The court dismissed the strict products
liability claim because the record in the case was "unclear whether
or not at the time of the sale there was any recognized risk which
called for a warning."'' 3
The decision in BichIer can be questioned on three counts.
First, as the dissenting justice noted, a motion for summary judg-
ment is not usually an appropriate time to determine whether the
defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the drug which
would have given rise to a duty to warn of them.' Second, the
court's reliance on Comment k may have been misplaced, since that
provision deals with "unavoidably unsafe products," which are"apparently useful and desirable. . . , attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk."105 It is true that many drugs have those
characteristics, but in Bichler there was no showing that DES fit
within this category. Finally, the court assumed, without deciding,
that a retailer cannot be held liable for selling an insufficiently
labeled product unless he has or should have knowledge of the insuf-
ficiency of the warning.'0 The court recognized that "many of the
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently
reasonable risk.
102. 58 A.D.2d at 335, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 59-60.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 335, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (Yesawich, J., dissenting in part).
105. The Comment includes within the definition of "unavoidably unsafe products"
many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity
for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even
of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and
use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SzcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965). If the "medically recognizable
risk" of such new drugs includes the risk of unforeseen side effects, then a drug dispensed
without warning of that possibility would seem not to qualify for the immunity from strict
liability which is provided by the Comment.
106. See 58 A.D.2d at 335, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 59. The court relied on RESTATEMENT (SEc-
on) OF TorS § 402A, Comment j (1965), which implies, but does not explain, the same
limitation: "[1The seller is required to give warning against [a dangerous ingredient], if he
has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight
should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger." However, that
Comment is directed to the question of what defects give rise to a duty to warn, not what
persons in the manufacturing and distribution chain have that duty. See id. The court also
quoted from Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 340-41, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461,
468 (1973), where the Court of Appeals had emphasized that nowadays it is the manufacturer
alone who has a practical opportunity to discover or avoid defects. In Codling, however, that
observation was used to justify extending strict liability without privity to manufacturers, not
to suggest that retail vendors should not be held strictly liable for the products they sold.
See id.
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very same social and economic reasons which prompted applying
[the strict products liability] doctrine to manufacturers and sup-
pliers militate, with equal force, in favor of applying it to retail-
ers."'' 0 7 It would have been helpful, therefore, if the court had ex-
plained what distinguished the pharmacist at the end of the drug-
distribution chain in Bichler from the appliance dealer at the end
of the refrigerator-distribution chain in Mead.
4. Services Distinguished from Products
Several attempts to use products liability theories in order to
recover, without showing fault, against persons providing services
were held unsuccessful during this Survey year.108 In Milau Asso-
ciates v. North Avenue Development Corp.,'09 commercial tenants
of a warehouse suffered substantial water damage when an under-
ground section of the building's sprinkler system burst. They sued
the general contractor that built the warehouse and the subcontrac-
tor that designed and installed the sprinkler system on theories of
negligence and breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. Evidence was presented that the subcontractor's tools
weakened the pipe, which had been supplied according to the con-
tract specifications and which had been installed by the subcontrac-
tor.'" The trial judge denied the plaintiffs' request to charge that
this weakening constituted a breach of the warranty that the pipe
was fit for its intended purpose."' The jury found for the defendants
on the question of negligence.12 The appellate division affirmed,
finding no evidence in the record of a breach of warranty."'
107. 58 A.D.2d at 334, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
108. In addition to Milau Associates v. North Avenue Development Corp., 42 N.Y.2d
482, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1977), there were two other cases worthy of note in
which architects were the defendants. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Associates, 43 N.Y.2d
389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977), involved, inter alia, a claim for breach of
implied warranty of fitness after an improperly designed snow-melting system caused cracks
in a concrete parking ramp. The Court noted its agreement with the determinations below
"that no action lies for breach of implied warranty, or what is now known as strict product
liability, on behalf of an owner against the architect with whom he has his contract." Id. at
398, 372 N.E.2d at 559, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 772. Likewise, in Queensbury Union Free School
District v. Jim Walter Corp., 91 Misc. 2d 804, 398 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct., Warren Co. 1977),
the court dismissed strict product liability and breach of warranty claims against the archi-
tect of a leaking roof.
109. 42 N.Y.2d 482, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1977).
110. Id. at 484, 368 N.E.2d at 1248-49, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
111. Id. at 485, 368 N.E.2d at 1249, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
112. Id. at 484-85, 368 N.E.2d at 1248-49, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
113. Milau Assocs. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 56 A.D.2d 587, 588, 391 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629-
1979] Torts
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The Court of Appeals affirmed, but took care to disassociate
itself from the appellate division's suggestion that "'in a proper
case, the implied warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code might apply to the "sale of goods" aspect of a hybrid sales-
service contract .. ' ."114 The Court reaffirmed its holding in
Perimutter v. Beth David Hospital,"5 that when the service aspect
of a contract predominates, liability without fault will not be im-
ported from the law of sales."6 As a matter of policy, it is unreasona-
ble to expect experts, hired to render services utilizing their special
skills, to produce infallible results. Therefore, "unless the parties
have contractually bound themselves to a higher standard of per-
formance" or to the accomplishment of a particular result,"reasonable care and competence owed generally by practitioners in
the particular trade or profession defines the limits of an injured
party's justifiable demands .... "I"
The Court's reasoning is unassailable, in that one cannot rea-
sonably expect infallible performance of services."' However, that
does not satisfactorily explain why one cannot reasonably expect
nondefective products to be provided incidentally to those services,
if such an expectation would be reasonable were the same goods
purchased alone. Regardless of whether the defendant is character-
ized as a vendor of goods or a provider of services, when goods are
furnished, he is the final step in a manufacturing and marketing
chain which nowadays induces consumers' reliance and is able to
spread the costs of the defective products it produces."'
Nevertheless, the results in both Perimutter and Milau may
have been justifiable on their particular facts. Perlmutter was a suit
against a charitable hospital for providing hepatitis-contaminated
blood.'20 The Court may well have been reluctant to impose strict
liability principles, which had developed in the commercial context,
30 (2d Dep't 1977).
114. 42 N.Y.2d at 485, 368 N.E.2d at 1249, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (quoting 56 A.D.2d at
587-88, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 629 (citations omitted)).
115. 308 N.Y. 100, 104, 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1954).
116. 42 N.Y.2d at 485-86, 368 N.E.2d at 1249, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
117. Id. at 486, 368 N.E.2d at 1250, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 885 (citation omitted).
118. See id. at 486, 368 N.E.2d at 1250, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
119. See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 340-41, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627-28, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 468-69 (1973).
120. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 103, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1954). See
also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 580(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978) (supplying blood declared to
be a public health service, not a sale).
[Vol. 30:555
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against a noncommercial entity which, at that time, enjoyed some
charitable immunity from even negligence liability.' 21 Furthermore,
in the "marketing" of human blood there is no advertising that
induces consumer reliance; by contrast, manufacturers of products
such as drugs and surgical supplies conduct substantial public rela-
tions campaigns extolling their virtues. Finally, human blood may
be distinguishable from other products in that the defect (hepatitis)
is neither man-made nor reasonably discoverable, so that there is
not the inequality between supplier and consumer regarding access
to knowledge of the defect that has been a major factor in imposing
strict liability.'
In Milau the operative factors were somewhat different, but
they too suggest that imposition of strict liability would have been
inappropriate. First, the defect was not associated with the market-
ing chain for the pipe, but rather was alleged by the plaintiffs to
have been caused by the defendants' installation of the system.,2 3
Thus, the case seems much closer to the traditional negligence para-
digm of a close relationship between producer and consumer, with
equivalent opportunities to discover defects, than to the modem
strict liability paradigm of mass production and distribution, where
advertising induces reliance and defects are difficult to discover
because of the complexity and packaging of the products. 24 Second,
and of greater importance to the Court, there were contracts which
spelled out the defendants' obligations.2 5 In such a situation, in-
volving an arm's-length commercial relationship, there is little need
to provide the warranties implied in law to protect consumers; 2 6 nor
121. See Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L.
Rav. 439, 458 & n.108 (1972). See also Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957) (charitable immunity abolished).
122. See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 340-41, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627-28, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 468-69 (1973).
123. See 42 N.Y.2d at 484, 368 N.E.2d at 1248-49, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
124. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
125. See 42 N.Y.2d at 487-88, 368 N.E.2d at 1250, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 885. The Milau
opinion is not entirely clear whether any contractual relation existed between the plaintiffs
and the defendants. Explicit mention is made of the subcontract between the defendants and
the agreement between the contractor and the owner, but the only suggestion of the plaintiffs'
participation in those agreements is a reference to "a subcontract in which [subcontractor]
Higgins undertook to design and put together a sprinkler system tailored to the needs of the
commercial tenants. . . ." Id. at 487, 368 N.E.2d at 1250, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
126. See Comment, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New Industrial State:
The Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 401, 408-
09 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Continuing the Common Law Response].
19791 Torts
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were the plaintiffs able to establish that the contracts implied in
fact a warranty that defect-free products would be provided. 27
Thus, the Court's decision properly turned on how the parties had
allocated the risks.
Even if the results in Perlmutter and Milau are justifiable, the
opinions pose a problem in their emphasis on the "sales"-"service" distinction. Lower courts may be led thereby to focus on
characterizing the transactions before them. Instead, these courts
should be analyzing-in light of factors such as induced consumer
reliance, relative access to knowledge of defects, and contractual
allocation of risks-whether the costs of defective products should
be placed on the consumer or the supplier.2 '
B. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In a case reminiscent of the classic Rylands v. Fletcher,12' the
Court of Appeals was faced with the question whether strict liability
127. 42 N.Y.2d at 487-88, 368 N.E.2d at 1250, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 885-86.
128. See Franklin, supra note 121, at 460-61. See generally Farnsworth, Implied Warran-
ties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLum. L. Rzv. 653 (1957); Continuing the Common
Law Response, supra note 126, at 401. The Court's discussion in Milau of "strict tort liability"
is enigmatic. First, the Court suggested that the plaintiffs might not be parties to, or third-
party beneficiaries of, the installation contracts (which the Court had earlier said defined the
defendants' duty of care): "To be sure, particularly in cases involving personal injury, the
absence of an enforceable contractual relationship for the technical sale of goods will not
necessarily result in the foreclosure of all remedies .... " 42 N.Y.2d at 488, 368 N.E.2d at
1251, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 886. Then, the Court rejected the application of the tort theory in the
case, but it is not at all clear whether the Court did so because the policies favoring the
imposition of this theory were not present, see id. at 488-89, 368 N.E.2d at 1251-52, 398
N.Y.S.2d at 886-87; because "the language and policies of the tort-based cases 'should not
be understood as in any way referring to the liability of a manufacturer [or tradesman] under
familiar but different doctrines of the law of contracts ... '' id. at 489, 368 N.E.2d at 1251,
398 N.Y.S.2d at 886 (quoting Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 400, 335
N.E.2d 275, 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41 (1975)); or because the plaintiffs "had at no time in
the course of litigation sought to invoke these [tort] doctrines to redress their no less real
but somehow less impelling economic loss." Id. at 489, 368 N.E.2d at 1251, 398 N.Y.S.2d at
886. Disposition on the last-stated ground would cause one to wonder (1) why water damage
to stored merchandise was called "economic loss" (which usually refers either to lost profits
or the cost of repairing the defective product) rather than "property damage," and (2) just
what the difference is between strict tort liability and breach of implied warranty that makes
it so important for a plaintiff not in privity to attach the right label to his claim.
129. L.R. 3 E. & I. App. 330 (1868), aff'g L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866). The Rylands doctrine
was expressly rejected by the New York Commission of Appeals in a case involving an
explosion of a steam boiler. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 485-87 (1873). However, as Dean
Prosser noted, "the law of. . . [Rylands] was misstated, and as misstated rejected, on facts
to which it had no proper application in the first place." W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 78, at
508-09.
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was appropriately imposed when waters percolating from a hy-
draulic landfill operation undermined bulkheads supporting the
property of neighboring landowners. 3° The Court adopted the"abnormally dangerous activity" standard of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts,'31 but remanded the case for a factual determination
whether the criteria established by section 520 of the Restatement
for the imposition of strict liability had been satisfied.
Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead'31 had its genesis in a
project to develop a public park on the defendant town's property.
In order to construct the park it was necessary to fill in marshland,
which was done by pumping a mixture of sand and water two miles
through a pipe and depositing it on the park site. A dike-and-weir
system had been constructed to channel and regulate the outflow of
water as the sand settled, but seepage from the site passed onto
plaintiffs' lands and caused their eventual subsidence.
Since the plaintiffs sued the town, its contractor, and the de-
sign engineer of the project on a theory of negligence, most of the
trial court evidence pertained to issues of due care and causation.
However, the trial court dismissed the negligence claims and in-
stead submitted the case to the jury on the theory that the defen-
dants' activity was of such a nature that they would be"'responsible for any damage proximately caused by this landfill
operation, with or without negligence or fault on their part.' "133 The
jury returned verdicts in favor of all three plaintiffs against all the
defendants, but the trial court set aside the verdicts against the
engineer and the contractor on the ground that absolute liability
applied only against the offending landowner. '34 The appellate divi-
sion modified the judgment by reinstating all the plaintiffs' ver-
dicts.' 35
The Court of Appeals held that a new trial was necessary on the
ground that the record was insufficient to establish that the defen-
dants' activities were abnormally dangerous, since the trial proceed-
130. Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 368 N.E.2d 24, 398 N.Y.S.2d
401 (1977), rev'g 51 A.D.2d 302, 381 N.Y.S.2d 287 (2d Dep't 1976).
131. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRS §§ 519-520 (1977).
132. See 42 N.Y.2d 440, 368 N.E.2d 24, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1977), rev'g 51 A.D.2d 302,
381 N.Y.S.2d 287 (2d Dep't 1976).
133. 51 A.D.2d 302, 307, 381 N.Y.S.2d 287, 290 (2d Dep't 1976).
134. Id. at 307-08, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 290. In addition, the trial court set aside all verdicts
in favor of one plaintiff for failure to notify the town of his claim for damages within the
prescribed statutory period. Id.; see N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 50-e (McKinney 1977).
135. 51 A.D.2d at 320, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 295-96.
19791 Torts
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ings were directed almost exclusively to the negligence charge. 3
The Court said that the plaintiffs were entitled to have their negli-
gence claims submitted to a jury, and that they were also entitled
to introduce, if they could, sufficient evidence to make a case for
strict liability.'37 Factors to be weighed in determining if an activity
is abnormally dangerous include those set out in section 520 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts: a high degree of risk with the poten-
tial for serious damage; an inability to eliminate the risk through
the use of reasonable care; and the extent to which the activity is
not one of common usage or appropriate to the place where it is
being carried on. 3' There was nothing in the record to substantiate
such factors, the Court said, although strict liability might be ap-
propriate under the facts of this case. The Court also noted that if
strict liability were appropriate, it could be imposed against the
contractor and the engineer, as well as against the adjacent land-
owner (the town). 31 The defendants would be able to cross claim
against each other.40
The decision in Doundoulakis hardly breaks new ground, since
numerous New York decisions dating back to 1866's' have imposed
liability without fault when defendants' activities have caused dam-
age to neighboring landowners by subterranean water flows. 142 Strict
136. 42 N.Y.2d at 453-54, 368 N.E.2d at 30, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 407-08.
137. Id. at 450-51, 368 N.E.2d at 28-29, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 405-06.
138. Id. at 448, 368 N.E.2d at 27, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 404. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toms
§ 520 (1977) provides:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are
to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attrib-
utes.
139. 42 N.Y.2d at 448-51, 368 N.E.2d at 27-29, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 404-06.
140. Id. at 451, 368 N.E.2d at 29, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 406. The Court dismissed the com-
plaint of the third owner against the town for failure to give notice within the statutory 90-
day period. In the Court's view, a letter to the town two years before the cause of action
accrued, threatening to hold the town liable for any future damage, could not suffice for the
required notice. Id. at 452, 368 N.E.2d at 29-30, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07.
141. See Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 531 (1866). But see Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y.
476, 487 (1873).
142. Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 51 A.D.2d 302,311-12, 381 N.Y.S.2d 287, 292-
93 (2d Dep't 1976).
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liability in those cases was imposed on a theory of trespass' or as
an outgrowth of the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. ,"
The significance of the present decision lies in the Court's apparent
adoption of the Restatement's "abnormally dangerous activity" for-
mulation of strict liability. The real question is how easy it will be
for the courts to weigh the factors listed in section 520.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals specified that the six cri-
teria listed in section 520 of the Restatement are "[p]articularly
useful.' 4 5 It then went on to point out the deficiencies in the record
below:
There is little if any information, for example, of the degree to
which hydraulic landfilling poses a risk of damage to neighboring
properties. Nor is there data on the gravity of any such danger, or
the extent to which the danger can be eliminated by reasonable
care. Basic to the inquiry, but not to be found in the record, are the
availability and relative cost, economic and otherwise, of alternative
methods of landfilling. There are other Restatement factors, and
perhaps still others, which the parties may develop as relevant,
about which there is little or nothing in the record.'46
Noting that "the case strongly suggests that strict liability treat-
ment may be appropriate,"' 47 the Court quoted from the opinion of
the appellate division:
"From . . .review of the authorities there emerges a dominant
theme, viz., that strict liability will be imposed upon those who
engage in an activity which poses a great danger of invasion of the
land of others. . . .Often underlying these invasion-causing activi-
ties is a deliberate interference, distortion, wrenching or manipula-
143. E.g., Mairs v. Manhattan Real Estate Ass'n, 89 N.Y. 498, 505 (1882); see Odell v.
Nyack Waterworks Co., 98 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 283, 285, 36 N.Y.S. 206, 207 (2d Dep't 1895). New
York has traditionally imposed strict liability (i.e., no intent or negligence required) for
trespasses to land, but that practice remains in only narrowly limited form. W. PROSSER,
supra note 29 § 13, at 64; see Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 331, 121 N.E.2d 249, 250-
51 (1954) (trespasser must intend act and invasion must be immediate or inevitable conse-
quence thereof); Wood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 958, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694-
95 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1961), aff'd mem., 16 A.D.2d 659, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 11 N.Y.2d 1053, 184 N.E.2d 180, 230 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1962).
144. E.g., Odell v. Nyack Waterworks Co., 98 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 283, 286, 36 N.Y.S. 206, 207
(2d Dep't 1895) ("the principle of law which require[s] persons so to use their property as
not necessarily to injure their neighbor"); see Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 521 (1866).
145. 42 N.Y.2d at 448, 368 N.E.2d at 27, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
146. Id. at 448-49, 368 N.E.2d at 27, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
147. Id. at 449, 368 N.E.2d at 27, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
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tion of natural forces, resources or equilibrium, frequently on a mas-
sive scale.""'
In neither of the quoted excerpts, nor in the rest of the opinion,
is there any specific mention of the three Restatement criteria which
the drafters considered essential to the imposition of strict liability
for "abnormally dangerous activities":
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is car-
ried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by
its dangerous attributes."'
As Comment h to section 520 notes:
A combination of the factors stated in Clauses (a), (b), and (c),
or sometimes any one of them alone, is commonly expressed by
saying that the activity is "ultrahazardous," or "extra-hazardous."
Liability for abnormally dangerous activities is not, howdver, a mat-
ter of these three factors alone, and those stated in Clauses (d), (e),
and (f) must still be taken into account. I"
It is unfortunate that the Court's opinion conveys the possibly mis-
leading impression that strict liability may be imposed on an activ-
ity without considering the context in which it is being conducted.
III. INTENTIONAL TORTS AND THE MALPRACTICE COUNTERsurr
Among the techniques which have been suggested to forestall
the increase in medical malpractice litigation is the threat of coun-
tersuits charging patients and their lawyers with tortiously bringing
or conducting unjustified litigation.' Several cases decided during
this Survey year bear on the "countersuit" technique; 152 they sug-
148. Id. at 449, 368 N.E.2d at 27-28, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (quoting 51 A.D.2d at 312, 381
N.Y.S.2d at 293).
149. RE TATEMENT (SEcoND) or ToRTs §§ 520(d)-(f) (1977).
150. Id. § 520, Comment h (emphasis supplied); see W. Paossmz, supra note 29 § 78, at
512.
151. E.g., Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Uh-
justified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1003-04 (1977).
152. Theories on which countersuits could be based include malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, and prima facie tort. Id. at 1004. In addition to the cases discussed in the text,
other decisions, in cases not involving countersuits, are also worthy of note. In Nardelli v.
Stamberg, 44 N.Y.2d 500, 377 N.E.2d 975, 406 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1978), the Court of Appeals held
that the "actual malice" required in an action for malicious prosecution was sufficient to
support the award of exemplary damages in such a case. Id. at 503, 377 N.E.2d at 976-77,
406 N.Y.S.2d at 445; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 908, Comment c (Tent. Draft
[Vol. 30:555
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gest that it is likely to be applicable in very few situations.
The only countersuit case in which the plaintiff enjoyed a mea-
sure of success, Drago v. Buonagurio, 153 arose out of a wrongful death
claim which had alleged that defendant Buonagurio's decedent died
because of malpractice by the plaintiff physician. The plaintiff al-
leged in his countersuit that he had never treated the decedent as a
patient; that the wrongful death action had been commenced at the
direction of defendant Brownstein as a discovery device in order to
ascertain where responsibility could be placed; that Brownstein's
actions were malicious, unethical, and grossly negligent; and that
the plaintiff had suffered much mental anguish and defamation of
character and was otherwise damaged. " ' Special term dismissed the
complaint for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. "5 The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed,
finding that the complaint alleged "a cause of action which should
be cognizable at law,"' " although the court remarked that "[i]t is
immaterial and unimportant whether we label the instant cause of
action one of prima facie tort or something else." '57
The court first considered the complaint in light of traditional
theories, but it noted that missing elements precluded recovery
under those theories. A claim of malicious prosecution would fail
No. 19, 1973); W. PRossER, supra note 29, § 119, at 847-48, 850. See also Martin v. City of
Albany, 42 N.Y.2d 13, 16-17, 364 N.E.2d 1304, 1307, 396 N.Y.S.2d 612, 614-15 (1977) (actual
malice may be implied from circumstances).
In ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 454, 368 N.E.2d 1230, 398 N.Y.S.2d 864
(1977), the Court held that a cause of action for prima facie tort is precluded when the
defendant's conduct is justified by a value to the public which outweighs the alleged harm
to the private plaintiff. Id. at 459-60, 368 N.E.2d at 1233, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 867; see Brandt v.
Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 634-35, 148 N.E.2d 160, 163-64, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828, 833-34 (1958) (no
prima facie tort liability for instigating action by public officials).
Finally, the Court held in Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 402
N.Y.S.2d 991 (1978), that liability could be imposed for intentional infliction of severe emo-
tional distress only if the defendant's conduct had been extreme and outrageous. Id. at 557,
373 N.E.2d at 1217, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 992-93; see Long v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 39 A.D.2d 11,
13-15, 330 N.Y.S.2d 664, 667-68 (4th Dep't 1972); Halio v. Lurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 65-67, 222
N.Y.S.2d 759, 762-64 (2d Dep't 1961); W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 12, at 56; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF ToarS § 46 & Comment d (1965). The Court in Fischer also questioned whether
the intentional infliction doctrine should be applicable when the conduct falls well within the
ambit of other traditional categories of tort liability (in that case, malicious prosecution or
abuse of process). 43 N.Y.2d at 558, 373 N.E.2d at 1217, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
153. 61 A.D.2d 282, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250 (3d Dep't 1978).
154. Id. at 284, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
155. 89 Misc. 2d 171, 391 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct., Schenectady Co. 1977).
156. 61 A.D.2d at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
157. Id. at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252-53.
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because there was no allegation of an interference with the plain-
tiff's person or property, 5 nor was it alleged that the wrongful death
action had terminated in the plaintiff doctor's favor.15' Likewise, an
abuse of process claim would fail because an allegation of improper
use of the court's process was lacking.6 0 Finally, New York law
recognizes neither liability to third parties for negligence by an at-
torney'I nor a cause of action for barratry.'6 2
On the premise that "the law should never suffer an injury and
a damage without a remedy,"''6 the court then turned its attention
to "the more innovative theory designated prima facie tort."'' 4 That
theory imposes liability for "the intentional infliction of harm, re-
sulting in damage, without excuse or justification, by an act or series
of acts which would otherwise be lawful. . . and which acts do not
fall within the categories of traditional tort . . ,"I" Since the
plaintiff could not, on the alleged facts, have been guilty of malprac-
tice, the obvious purpose of the wrongful death action was to benefit
the attorney and his client, and because the apparent'consequence
was foreseeable harm to the physician, the court concluded that the
complaint should be deemed sufficient.'66 As the court stated:
"[T]he act was not only intentional and wrongful, but under the
unusual circumstances alleged, irresponsible and without justifica-
tion." 67
It is interesting that the court did not say explicitly that the
158. Id. at 285, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 251 (citing Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 596
n.2, 246 N.E.2d 333, 335 n.2, 298 N.Y.S.2d 473, 477 n.2 (1969)).
159. Id. (citing Lewis v. Village of Deposit, 40 A.D.2d 730, 336 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dep't
1972), aff'd mem., 33 N.Y.2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 422, 347 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1973)).
160. Id. at 285, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252; see Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom
Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 401-03, 343 N.E.2d 278, 281-83, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 640-42
(1975); Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 596, 246 N.E.2d 333, 335, 298 N.Y.S.2d 473,476-
77 (1969).
161. 61 A.D.2d at 285, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252; see Gifford v. Harley, 62 A.D.2d 5, 404
N.Y.S.2d 405 (3d Dep't 1978); Joffee v. Rubenstein, 24 A.D.2d 752, 263 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1st
Dep't 1965), appeal dismissed, 21 N.Y.2d 721, 724 N.E.2d 706, 287 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1968);
Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct., Rockland Co. 1973), aff'd
mem., 43 A.D.2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (2d Dep't 1974).
162. See 1965 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 1030, repealing 1909 N.Y. PENAL LAw app. §§ 320-
323 (McKinney 1967).
163. 61 A.D.2d at 285, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citations omitted); see Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers
Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 405-06, 343 N.E.2d 278, 284, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 643 (1975).
166. 61 A.D.2d at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
167. Id.
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plaintiff had alleged a claim fitting within the "non-category""' of
prima facie tort. That theory has traditionally required pecuniary
injury,"' so the plaintiff's complaint would probably have been in-
sufficient to constitute a prima facie tort. Only by the liberal view
which the court acknowledged it took of the facts' ° and which it in
truth took of the law, could a countersuit against intentional, base-
less, and damaging charges be upheld. With its emphasis on the
unique facts of the case (i.e., that the plaintiff had never treated the
decedent)'7 ' and its caution that the opinion should not be read "as
creating or recognizing a distinctly new cause of action whenever a
physician escapes malpractice liability and claims he was wrong-
fully charged in the first place, 1172 the opinion in Drago gives little
encouragement to those who would use the prima facie tort theory
for a countersuit to a malpractice action.1 3
Two other appellate division decisions74 dismissed claims
which had been commenced by doctors against whom malpractice
suits had previously been brought and then discontinued. In Belsky
v. Lowenthal,'75 the doctor countersued the former patient and her
husband who brought the suit. Claims based on a malicious prose-
cution theory were dismissed for failure to allege an interference
with the plaintiff doctor's person or property.' A claim based on a
theory which the plaintiff originally denominated (but later aban-
doned) as abuse of process was denied cognizance as prima facie tort
because, the court said,
[iut would be unwise, we think, to allow every unrealized cause of
action to be tortured into a prima facie tort action, by the liberal
168. See generally Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d
397, 406 n. *, 343 N.E.2d 278, 284 n. *, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 645 n. * (1975).
169. See ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 368 N.E.2d 1230, 1232,
398 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (1977).
170. 61 A.D.2d at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
171. Id. at 284, 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 251, 252.
172. Id. at 286-87, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
173. See Kramer, Medical Malpractice, 179 N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1978, at 28, col. 1.
174. Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 A.D.2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st Dep't 1978); Aquilina v.
O'Connor, 59 A.D.2d 454, 399 N.Y.S.2d 919 (3d Dep't 1977).
175. 62 A.D.2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (lst Dep't 1978).
176. Id. at 321, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 64; see Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 596 n.2,
246 N.E.2d 333, 335 n.2, 298 N.Y.S.2d 473, 477 n.2 (1969). The Court in Belsky did not
consider the defendants' contention that discontinuance of the prior proceeding by stipula-
tion was not a favorable termination sufficient for a malicious prosecution action. 62 A.D.2d
at 321, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 64; see Pagliarulo v. Pagliarulo, 30 A.D.2d 840, 293 N.Y.S.2d 13 (2d
Dep't 1968). But see Aquilina v. O'Connor, 59 A.D.2d 454, 457, 399 N.Y.S.2d 919, 921 (3d
Dep't 1977), discussed in p. 584 & notes 179-82 infra.
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application of "malicious" to the motives of the disappointed plain-
tiff, thus affording a forum for a never-ending source of new litiga-
tion. Every failed suit for medical malpractice could conceivably
then be made the basis of a prima facie tort. "'
Furthermore, the strong public policy of allowing all parties to have
access to the courts means that fear of reprisal beyond the imposi-
tion of court costs should not be allowed to act as a deterrent.1 7
In Aquilina v. O'Connor7' the doctor who had been sued for
malpractice followed a different course in attempting to vindicate
his conduct, but he was likewise unsuccessful. After his malpractice
insurer and its counsel obtained, over the doctor's objection, a dis-
continuance with prejudice of the action against him, he sued not
only the former plaintiff and her attorneys (on theories of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process), but also the insurer and its coun-
sel for breaching the insurance contract by settling without his con-
sent. Special term dismissed the contract claim and the Third De-
partment affirmed. As the court noted, even if the plaintiff doctor
incurred expenses and suffered damages to his professional reputa-
tion, he had "no abstract 'right' to have a judicial determination on
the facts of any lawsuit."' 0 Once the malpractice plaintiff discon-
tinued her suit without payment of any consideration from the doc-
tor, that case was terminated and the doctor had no interest that
would allow him to insist on further litigation. With regard to the
contract, which provided that "'no claim or suit shall be settled or
compromised by the company except with the written consent of the
insured,' " the court held that the discontinuance without payment
or concession was not a "'compromise or settlement.' "181 However,
the court said that the discontinuance would constitute a
"'favorable termination'" sufficient to support the doctor's claim
for malicious prosecution. 82
177. 62 A.D.2d at 322, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
178. Id. at 322-23, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 65; see Chappelle v. Gross, 26 A.D.2d 340, 345, 274
N.Y.S.2d 555, 561 (1st Dep't 1966) (Steuer, J., dissenting).
179. 59 A.D.2d 454, 399 N.Y.S.2d 919 (3d Dep't 1977).
180. Id. at 456, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
181. Id. at 457, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 921; see Putnam v. Otsego Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 41 A.D.2d
981, 982, 343 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (3d Dep't 1973), modified, 45 A.D.2d 556, 557-58, 360
N.Y.S.2d 331, 333-34 (3d Dep't 1974).
182. 59 A.D.2d at 457, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 921; see Louvad Realty Corp. v. Anfang, 267 A.D.
567, 568, 47 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421.22 (1st Dep't 1944). But see Pagliarulo v. Pagliarulo, 30 A.D.2d
840, 293 N.Y.S.2d 13 (2d Dep't 1968).
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IV. NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE18 3
A. Negligent Misrepresentation
In White v. Guarente, I" decided during this Survey year by the
Court of Appeals, an accounting firm was sued for professional mal-
practice for preparing and distributing inaccurate and misleading
financial reports of a limited partnership. The centerpiece of the
Court's ruling was its holding that an accounting firm owes a duty
of due care to a definable group of limited partners, although not
to the investing public at large. '
The action was brought by one of the partnership's limited
183. There were other noteworthy negligence and malpractice decisions in addition to
the cases discussed in the text. The Court of Claims, per Justice Mangum, rejected the
"locality rule" as the standard of due care in a medical malpractice case. Instead, the physi-
cian will be held to "that degree of care and skill expected of the average practitioner in the
class to which he belongs, having regard for the circumstances under which he must act, the
advances of his profession and the medical resources reasonably available." Hirschberg v.
State, 91 Misc. 2d 590, 597, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470, 475 (Ct. Cl. 1977). The decision, if followed,
will bring New York into line with other jurisdictions which have recognized that modem
transportation, communication, and medical education have made the locality rule outdated.
See, e.g., Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 105, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968); Carbone v.
Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 424, 94 A.2d 680, 683 (1953) (Brennan, J.); Pederson v. Dumouchel,
72 Wash. 2d 73, 79, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967). In any event, as the court in Hirschberg
observed, the locality rule is especially inappropriate when applied to doctors in the state
hospital system, where state-wide standards are established by statute and regulation. 91
Misc. 2d at 598, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
The Third Department held that in a legal malpractice action for failing to prosecute
two negligence claims, the damages need not be reduced by any contingency fee the defendant
would have earned if he had performed the promised services. Andrews v. Cain, 62 A.D.2d
612, 406 N.Y.S.2d 168 (3d Dep't 1978). Rejecting the rule set out in Childs v. Comstock, 69
A.D. 160, 169, 74 N.Y.S. 643, 649 (1st Dep't 1902), the court concluded that deducting the
unearned contingent fee would unfairly force the plaintiff to pay twice for the same serv-
ice-once to the defendant and the other time to counsel in the malpractice action. 62 A.D.2d
at 613, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 169; accord, Duncan v. Lord, 409 F. Supp. 687, 691-92 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
The Second Department held, in a three-to-two decision, that a plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action was permitted to examine the physician member of a medical malpractice
mediation panel as to the basis of the panel's unanimous recommendation of liability, not-
withstanding N.Y. Jun. LAw § 148-a(8) (McKinney Supp. 1978), which provides that the
panel member may be examined "with reference to the recommendation of the panel only."
Curtis v. Brookdale Hosp., 62 A.D.2d 749, 406 N.Y.S.2d 494 (2d Dep't 1978). The court found
that both the statutory language and the legislative intention clearly pointed toward permit-
ting testimony as to the basis for the recommendation; an examination limited to the recom-
mendation itself and the witness's qualifications would be cumulative and unnecessary. Id.
at 753-55, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 496. The dissenters feared that under the majority's view, the
professional members of the panel would be serving in an expert-witness role rather than in
the intended quasi-judicial capacity. Id. at 756, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 498 (Titone, J., dissenting).
184. 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977).
185. Id. at 363, 372 N.E.2d at 320, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
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partners against the two general partners and the accounting firm
which prepared the partnership's yearly financial report and tax
audit. The claim against the accounting firm was based on its al-
leged failure to comment in the report on the withdrawal by the
general partners of approximately eighty percent of the capital in-
vestment.'86 The withdrawals, which the partnership agreement per-
mitted only at the end of the fiscal year, were allegedly back-dated
to avoid detection, and were lumped in with the withdrawals of the
limited partners so as to cover the fact that the general partners had
withdrawn the bulk of their investment."' Special term dismissed
the complaint against the accounting firm for failure to state a cause
of action and the appellate division affirmed.' u
In the Court of Appeals the accountants argued that the plain-
tiff could not sue because he was not in privity with their firm."'
The Court dismissed this contention and held that the defendant's
assumption of the task of auditing for the limited partnership was
the assumption of a duty to act for the benefit of the "fixed, defina-
ble and contemplated group" of limited partners."' The Court thus
distinguished the classic Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, ' which ruled
that accountants could not be held responsible, when preparing
their reports, to " 'the indeterminate class of persons who, presently
or in the future, might deal with the . . company in reliance on
the audit.' "182
Having assumed the task of preparing a tax audit for the part-
nership, the Court said, the accountants "must have been aware"
that the limited partners would rely on those reports in preparing
their own tax returns."13 There was, therefore, a duty imposed by law
to audit carefully, and the defendants' negligence in preparing the
report and distributing it to the partners, who they knew were likely
to act on it, was actionable."4
186. Id. at 360, 372 N.E.2d at 317-18, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
187. Id.
188. 54 A.D.2d 878, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1st Dep't 1976).
189. 43 N.Y.2d at 360-61, 372 N.E.2d at 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
190. Id. at 362, 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
191. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
192. 43 N.Y.2d at 361, 372 N.E.2d at 318,401 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (quoting Ultraraares Corp.
v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 183, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (1931)).
193. Id. at 361, 372 N.E.2d at 318-19, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477-78.
194. 43 N.Y.2d at 361-63, 372 N.E.2d at 318-20, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477-79.
[Vol. 30:555
HeinOnline  -- 30 Syracuse L. Rev. 586 1979
Torts
B. "Wrongful Life"
At the end of the last Survey year, the Court of Appeals decided
in Howard v. Lecher"5 that parents could not recover for the emo-
tional distress they suffered from watching their child die of a ge-
netic disease that had not been diagnosed in time for an abortion
to be performed. That decision, however, hardly resolved all the
questions posed by the "wrongful life" cases; this Survey year the
Second Department twice1" upheld claims for medical expenses,
loss of the mother's services, and the child's pain and suffering.
Park v. Chessin"7 involved a mother who had given birth in
1969 to a child who lived for five hours before dying of polycystic
kidney disease. Immediately after the infant's death, the parents
asked the defendant obstetricians about the risk involved if they
had a second child. They were told that the chances of a second
child being afflicted with polycystic kidney disease were"practically nil.""' That advice was incorrect; the mother gave
birth to a second child in 1970, and that child lived for two-and-one-
half years before succumbing to polycystic kidney disease.
Plaintiff parents then brought suit against the defendants in
the name of the second child for her "wrongful life," and in their
own behalf for medical expenses, emotional distress, and loss of
services, relying on theories of both fraud and malpractice."' Spe-
cial term dismissed the claims for emotional distress and those
based on fraud, but sustained the cause of action for "wrongful life"
and the malpractice actions of the parents for medical expenses and
loss of services.2
The appellate division affirmed, 21 distinguishing its earlier de-
195. 42 N.Y.2d 109, 112-13, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365-66 (1977), noted
in Birnbaum & Rheingold, Torts, 1977 Survey of N. Y. Law, 29 SYRAcus. L. Rav. 593, 604-10
(1978).
196. Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1977) (recovery for
medical expenses and loss of services to the extent that these elements were not based on
psychiatric injuries or emotional distress); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 i{.Y.S.2d 110
(2d Dep't 1977), discussed in pp. 587-90 & notes 197-222 infra.
197. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1977).
198. Id. at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
199. Id.
200. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1976).
201. The court modified the order below to dismiss those portions of the complaint
seeking to recover damages for the "mental anguish" or emotional distress of the plaintiff wife
and for the loss of her services, insofar as the claim for loss of services was based on her mental
anguish or emotional distress. 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
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cision in Howard v. Lechere20 on the theory that in Howard the
plaintiffs were attempting to hold the defendant doctor liable for
failing to volunteer information about genetics to prospective par-
ents. 2 3 There, the court in Park stated, it would have been too great
an extension of liability to force physicians to become "virtual
insurer[s] of the genetic health of newborns . *... ,,21 In the pres-
ent case, by contrast, the plaintiffs had gone to the defendants
seeking specific advice. The defendants were aware of the death of
the first child and knew that the plaintiffs would act on their advice.
By giving inaccurate advice, the defendants failed to live up to the
stricter standard of care imposed on doctors in such situations and,
therefore, were liable for their malpractice.20 5
Because the duty owed in this case flowed from the doctors to
the plaintiffs seeking their advice, the doctors could be held liable
for the subsequent medical expenses of the parents and the resul-
tant loss of the mother's services."' However, damages for emotional
distress on the part of the mother were barred because of the inabil-
ity to calculate the damages and the absence of any duty."
With respect to the child's "wrongful life" claim, the court
acknowledged that such an action had not yet been recognized in
202. 53 A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (2d Dep't 1976), affl'd, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d
64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
203. See 60 A.D.2d at 84-85, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
204. Id. at 84, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 112 (construing Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 424,
386 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (2d Dep't 1976), affl'd, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d
363 (1977)). The emphasis of the Howard majority opinions in both the Court of Appeals and
the appellate division was on the difficulties with emotional injuries, not on the burden of
genetic counseling for physicians. See Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 112, 366 N.E.2d 64,
65-66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (1977); 53 A.D.2d at 424, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 462. See generally
Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate
Genetic Counseling, 87 YAx L.J. 1488, 1490-96, 1504-08 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Father
and Mother Know Best].
205. 60 A.D.2d at 85-86, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 112-13.
206. Id. at 86-87, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113. The plaintiffs apparently did not assert claims
for expenses (other than medical expenses) incurred in supporting the child. Such claims have
been recognized, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 588, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119, 120 (2d
Dep't 1977) (Titone, J., concurring); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 75-76, 394 N.Y.S.2d
933, 934-35 (4th Dep't 1977); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 231, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267
(4th Dep't 1974) (negligent failure to diagnose pregnancy resulting in birth of healthy child).
Expenses of supporting a "wrongfully born" child should be offset by the benefits (tangible
or intangible) the child might bring. Father and Mother Know Best, supra note 204, at 1512;
see Ziemba v. Steinberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 234-35, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270-71 (4th Dep't 1974)
(Cardamone, J., dissenting).
207. 60 A.D.2d at 86, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113; see Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 112,
366 N.E.2d 64, 65-66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (1977).
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New York or other jurisdictions. "' However, in view of "expanding
technological, economic and social change," the court held that a"wrongful life" cause of action could exist.2" A couple has a legally
recognized right not to have a child, and this right extends to cir-
cumstances in which it could be determined with reasonable cer-
tainty that the child might be born deformed. 2 ° Damages would not
be speculative because the action would be for the injuries to, and
the conscious pain and suffering of, the infant during her shortlife.21'
A strong dissent was filed in Park by Justice Titone, who argued
that the majority opinion had no legal basis, and had in fact flown
in the face of recent precedent, when it recognized these causes of
action on behalf of the child.212 Furthermore, he argued that since"wrongful death" actions were not judicially recognized until passed
by a legislature, neither should a "wrongful life" action be recog-
nized until it has been so passed.213 The dissenting justice would also
have dismissed the parents' claims for medical expenses and loss of
services on the ground that these claims were based on a theory that
the infant should never have been born, a theory which he claimed
has not met with the favor of any court faced with the problem.214
The court's decision in Park to allow the parents' claims for
medical expenses and loss of services is certainly not inconsistent
with the Howard decision. The Howard Court had been concerned
with the difficulty in circumscribing the duty to avoid emotional
injuries;15 the items claimed in Park posed no similar limitation
problems. However, the claim on behalf of the infant, whether gen-
erally labeled "wrongful life" or made specifically for her disability
and conscious pain and suffering,21 raises complex issues with
208. 60 A.D.2d at 87, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114; see Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 79-
81, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937 (4th Dep't 1977).
209. 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
210. Id.; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney
1975).
211. See 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
212. Id. at 89, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 115 (Titone, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 91, 400 N.Y.S.21 at 116-17 (Titone, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 93-94, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 118 (Titone, J., dissenting); see Karlsons v. Guerinot,
57 A.D.2d 73, 79-81, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937 (4th Dep't 1977); cf. Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d
481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966) (no cause of action for being born illegitimate).
215. See 42 N.Y.2d at 112, 366 N.E.2d at 65-66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365; note 204 supra.
216. It is unclear whether the plaintiffs had labeled the claim "wrongful life" or whether
they had claimed for the infant's pain and suffering and it was so denominated by the judges.
See 88 Misc. 2d at 225-26, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 207; 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 115
(Cohalan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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which the court in Park dealt only summarily. It was rightly noted
that the argument sometimes used to deny the cause of action, that
no legal abortion would have been available,1 17 was no longer applic-
able." 8 It is too much, though, to say, as the court did, that the
breach of the parents' right not to have a child (inferable from the
abolition of the statutory ban on abortion) is also "tortious to the
fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional
human being." ' 21" Further, the court never explained what
"technological, economic [or] social change" now makes it possible
to determine both that the infant is worse off as a result of the
negligence causing the wrongful life than if she had never been born,
and the amount of the resulting damages.
The Park decision in effect allows the parents to obtain indi-
rectly, through the child's "wrongful life" claim, the damages for
emotional distress that they cannot obtain directly. Certainly the
damages for "conscious pain and suffering" will not compensate the
deceased child for her injuries; this compensation goes only to the
parents, whose real emotional distress is denied direct relief by the
excessively cautious attitude of the Court of Appeals. 20 Even for the"wrongfully born" child who survives, recognition of the child's
cause of action poses the imponderable question whether her pain
and suffering may be regarded as an injury, given the alternative of
not being born at all.22' It would be better to grant relief to the
parents, who are the persons quite foreseeably suffering emotional
injuries when the doctor breaches the duty that he owes to them,
as patients, to provide reasonably careful genetic counseling.22
C. Wrongful Death Damages
The New York wrongful death statute 2 2 provides that the desig-
217. See, e.g., Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531, 532, 313 N.Y.S.2d
502, 503 (2d Dep't 1970), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
218. 60 A.D.2d at 87-88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 125.05 (McKinney 1975).
219. 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
220. Torts, 1977 Survey, supra note 195, at 608-09; see Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109,
117, 366 N.E.2d 64, 69, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367-68 (1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting).
221. See Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 484-85, 223 N.E.2d 343, 345, 276 N.Y.S.2d
885, 888 (1966) (Keating, J., concurring); Father and Mother Know Best, supra note 204, at
1500-02.
222. See Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 116-17, 366 N.E.2d 64, 68-69, 397 N.Y.S.2d
363, 368 (1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d at 86-87, 400 N.Y.S.2d at
113-14; Torts, 1977 Survey, supra note 195, at 609; Father and Mother Know Best, supra note
204, at 1514 (1978).
223. N.Y. EPTL 5-4.1 to 5-4.6 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1978).
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nated beneficiaries may recover "fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's death." 2 Two deci-
sions during this Survey year2 reached opposite results on the ques-
tion whether the wrongful death statute encompassed a widow's
claim for loss of consortium.
The Third Department held, in Osborn v. Kelley,22 that loss of
consortium could be recovered only for the period prior to the dece-
dent's death.m The court denied any cause of action for post-death
loss of consortium on the ground that the consortium claim was
"derivative. '"m Since the decedent has no cause of action for his
death, the court reasoned that the surviving spouse has no cause of
action after the death from which to derive the claim for loss of
consortium.22°
The court appears to have misconceived the premise from
which it argued that a loss of consortium action is derivative and a
wrongful death action is not. It is true that the loss of consortium
claim is derivative, in the sense that it will be barred if the claim
from which it is derived is barred by the statute of limitations, a
settlement or judgment, contributory negligence, or otherwise. 230
However, a wrongful death cause of action is derivative in that sense
also. 2s3 In a second sense, though, neither action is derivative. The
224. N.Y. EPTL 5-4.3 (McKinney 1967) provides, in pertinent part:
The damages awarded to the plaintiff may be such sum as the jury or, where
issues of fact are tried without a jury, the court or referee deems to be fair and just
compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's death to the
persons for whose benefit the action is brought.
225. Osborn v. Kelley, 61 A.D.2d 367, 402 N,Y.S.2d 463 (3d Dep't 1978); Lehman v.
Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 93 Misc. 2d 539, 402 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
Co. 1978).
226. 61 A.D.2d 367, 402 N.Y.S.2d 463 (3d Dep't 1978).
227. Id. at 370, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 370, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65; see N.Y. EPTL 11-3.3 (McKinney 1967)
("[w]here an injury causes the death of a person the damages recoverable for such injuryare limited to those accruing before death and shall not include damages for or by reason of
death").
230. See Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498,507-08, 239 N.E.2d 897,
902-03, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 312 (1968) (wife's claim should be joined with husband's claim,
but it is barred if his "has been terminated either by judgment, settlement or otherwise").
231. See Myers v. City of Plattsburgh, 13 A.D.2d 866, 214 N.Y.S.2d 773 (3d Dep't 1961)
(wrongful death claim barred by expiration of personal injury statute within decedent's
lifetime); Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Newman, 2 Misc. 2d 348, 354, 47 N.Y.S.2d 804, 810 (Sup.
Ct., Bronx Co.), affd mem., 268 A.D. 967, 51 N.Y.S.2d 767 (lst Dep't 1944), appeal denied,
268 A.D. 1039, 52 N.Y.S.2d 948 (lst Dep't 1945) (personal injury judgment recovered during
decedent's lifetime bars wrongful death claim); N.Y. CPLR 1411 (McKinney 1976) (contribu-
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plaintiff in each case has been permitted to sue for an injury done
personally to her: the wife in the consortium action sues for the loss
of society and services to her;232 the widow in the wrongful death
action sues for the benefits she will not receive. 23 It is not as if the
plaintiff were suing in representative capacities, e.g., as an adminis-
tratrix in a survival action.234 The opinion in Osborn, however,
clearly treats the cause of action for consortium as "derivative" in
the first sense, and the wrongful death cause of action as "not deriv-
ative" in the second sense. 235 The distinction thus taken avoids the
true issue in the case, which is whether loss of consortium is a"pecuniary injury," i.e., whether that element of damage is properly
recoverable within the limitations of the cause of action recognized
by the law.
That issue was addressed by Justice Nussbaum in Lehman v.
Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,211 where the court con-
cluded that loss of consortium is a pecuniary injury. The court noted
that the Court of Appeals has not insisted upon a strict interpreta-
tion of the term "pecuniary injuries," but has, for example, permit-
ted children to recover for "'the loss of bodily care, or intellectual
culture, or moral training, which the mother had before supplied
... , ,,23 By extension, then, "[t]o recognize that children suffer
from the loss of society of their parents and allow recovery to them
in wrongful death actions, but to reject this concept as between
married persons draws a distinction without a difference."
The court, by characterizing the claims of both child and
spouse as being for "loss of society," glossed over a potentially trou-
blesome distinction. The damages recoverable by a child for the
wrongful death of a parent include loss of "parental guidance, ad-
vice and care,"' ' 1 but not "emotional deprivation. 2 0 The permitted
tory negligence of decedent diminishes wrongful death damages in causes of action accruing
on or after Sept. 1, 1975); N.Y. EPTL 5-4.2 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (contributory negligence
of decedent constitutes defense to wrongful death claims accruing before Sept. 1, 1975).
232. See Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 502-03, 239 N.E.2d 897,
899, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1968).
233. See N.Y. EPTL 5-4.3, 5-4.4 (McKinney 1967).
234. Id. 11-3.2(b) (McKinney 1967).
235. See 61 A.D.2d at 370, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65.
236. 93 Misc. 2d 539, 402 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1978).
237. Id. at 541-42, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 953 (quoting Tilley v. Hudson River R.R., 29 N.Y.
252, 286-87 (1864)).
238. Id. at 542, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
239. Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 26 A.D.2d 155, 161, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866, 873
(1st Dep't 1966) (Breitel, J.).
240. Id. at 162, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
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elements can all be provided by persons other than the parents,
persons whose services may be employed in a market attaching a
pecuniary value to those services. Consortium, on the other hand,"embraces such elements as love, companionship, affection, society,
sexual relations, solace and more."2 4 As the Court of Appeals noted
when it recognized the wife's cause of action for loss of consortium
in Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co.,2 12 those elements reflect
injury to "essentially emotional interests. 2 3 Money which may be
awarded for such interests in a consortium action does not reflect
the price of obtaining other persons to provide the benefits lost,
since many of the benefits involve a unique relationship and, there-
fore, are essentially irreplaceable. Nevertheless, money "is the only
known means to compensate for the loss suffered and to symbolize
society's recognition that a culpable wrong-even if uninten-
tional-has been done. 2 4 Viewed in that light, damages for loss of
consortium may be recoverable in the common-law cause of action
while the physically injured spouse lives, but not in the statutory
action for wrongful death which is expressly limited to "pecuniary
injuries."
The reference in Lehman to loss of the husband's "services,"245
like the reference to loss of "society," equally glosses over the signifi-
cant distinction. Replaceable services which have market values,
such as chauffering, should be recoverable in the wrongful death
cause of action whether or not denominated as "loss of consortium";
the preceding discussion, however, suggests why emotional services
and those uniquely provided by the decedent (e.g., companionship,
sexual relations, and solace) should not.
V. DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
A. Pretrial Discovery of "New York Times Malice"
In order to promote the vigor and variety of public debate, the
United States Supreme Court held in New York Times Co. v.
241. Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 502, 239 N.E.2d 897, 899,
293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1968).
242. 22 N.Y.2d 498, 505, 239 N.E.2d 897, 900-01, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 310 (1968).
243. Id. at 507, 239 N.E.2d at 902, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
244. Id. at 507, 239 N.E.2d at 902, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
245. It is not clear whether the plaintiff claimed for "loss of services and society" of her
husband, or whether the court was just so characterizing the action. See 93 Misc. 2d at 540,
402 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
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Sullivan4 6 that a public official could recover for libel only if he
proved that the defamatory statement was made "with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not." 247 Later decisions by the Court established that this "New
York Times malice" standard required a subjective inquiry into the
defendant's state of mind. 5 It was therefore noteworthy when the
Second Circuit held during this Survey year that the plaintiff in a
public-figure defamation action cannot obtain direct evidence
through pretrial discovery of the defendant's state of mind.24'
Herbert v. Lando20 had its genesis in 1971 when plaintiff Her-
bert publicly charged his superior army officers with covering up
war crimes in Vietnam. The intense debate over the war and Her-
bert's being a much-decorated soldier contributed to the affair be-
coming a cause cel~bre. However, the superior officers were ulti-
mately cleared after a military investigation, and Herbert was re-
moved from his command on the basis of a "poor efficiency re-
port."2 51
In 1972 defendant Lando began investigating the Herbert case
for the CBS documentary program "60 Minutes," of which he was
associate producer. Lando interviewed the soldiers who were in a
position to corroborate Herbert's charges, as well as the superior
officers charged and Herbert himself. Lando's investigation uncov-
ered discrepancies between Herbert's version of events and the ver-
sions of others who were present when the events took place. These
discrepancies were subsequently reported in a broadcast on "60
Minutes" and an article in the Atlantic Monthly, both of which
clearly cast doubt on all of Herbert's allegations.52 As a result,
Herbert sued Lando, CBS, and the Atlantic Monthly for defama-
tion .253
Lando cooperated in the extensive pretrial discovery in the suit,
except as to "a small number of questions relating to his beliefs,
246. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
247. Id. at 279-80. The standard was later made applicable to "public figures" in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 335-37 (1974).
248. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 335 n.6 (1974).
249. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
250. 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
251. Id. at 980.
252. Id. at 982.
253. Id.
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opinions, intent and conclusions in preparing the program." The
inquiries to which Lando objected included: his conclusions regard-
ing leads to be pursued or not to be pursued; his beliefs in the
veracity of persons interviewed; the bases for conclusions he reached
concerning the veracity of persons; conversations with Mike Wal-
lace, a correspondent on "60 Minutes," about matter to be included
in or excluded from the broadcast; and his intentions as manifested
by his decision to include or exclude material.25 Lando's objection,
that any response to these questions would be inconsistent with the
protections afforded the editorial process by the first amendment,
was overruled by the trial court, which granted the plaintiff's mo-
tion to compel discovery.m
In reversing and remanding the decision below, Chief Judge
Kaufman focused on the constitutional protection afforded the
press's functioning and the essential role of the editorial process in
that work. The free flow of information, which is the objective of
first amendment protection, 7 requires not only freedom in acquir-
ing information,2 but also protection of the editorial process by
which "information" is transformed into "news."' That process
was unanimously given protection by the United States Supreme
Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornilo, 10 when it held
that a "right-of-reply" statute would unconstitutionally burden an
editor's exercise of judgment in choosing whether to print newswor-
thy material.21 Similarly, according to the Chief Judge, discovery
of Lando's thoughts, opinions, and conclusions would tend to stifle
the free flow of ideas that is the objective of the first amendment:
The answers . . . [Herbert] seeks strike to the heart of the vital
human component of the editorial process. Faced with the possibil-
ity of such an inquisition, reporters and journalists would be reluc-
tant to express their doubts. Indeed, they would be chilled in the
254. Id. at 982-83 (footnote omitted).
255. Id. at 983; see Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
256. 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The question, however, was certified for an interlo-
cutory appeal. 568 F.2d at 983.
257. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (heavy
presumption against constitutionalty of prior restraints on expression); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
258. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated").
259. 568 F.2d at 976-79.
260. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
261. See id. at 257-58.
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very process of thought. As we expressed above, the tendency would
be to follow the safe course of avoiding contention and contro-
versy-the antithesis of the values fostered by the First Amend-
ment.2 1
Judge Oakes, concurring, relied not only on the constitutional
protection afforded the editorial process, but also on what he saw
as the Supreme Court's evolving recognition of the press as an insti-
tution entitled to special protection. Relying in part on a speech by
Mr. Justice Stewart at the Yale Law School, 63 he noted that the
Supreme Court has treated the constitutional provision for freedom
of the press, unlike freedom of speech, as creating" 'a fourth institu-
tion outside the Government as an additional check on the three
official branches.' "264 Viewing the institutional press as integral to
our governmental structure, Judge Oakes argued: "[T]o the extent
that the independent exercise of editorial functions is threatened by
governmental action, the very foundations of the architectural mas-
terpiece that is our form of government are shaken, the supporting
columns weakened.112 1 In his mind, the question then becomes what
level of protection is necessary to ensure an independent, institu-
tional freedom of the press. 2 He concluded that only protecting the
editors' thought-processes entirely from discovery-not just appli-
cation of the "New York Times malice" test, nor even application
of a rule permitting discovery only when the evidence sought is
"direct evidence of a highly relevant matter which cannot otherwise
be obtained" 211-is sufficient to satisfy the mandates of Tornillo.20
262. 568 F.2d at 984.
263. Id. at 986 (Oakes, J., concurring); see Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J.
631 (1975).
264. 568 F.2d at 988 (Oakes, J., concurring) (quoting Stewart, supra note 263, at 634).
265. Id. (Oakes, J., concurring).
266. Id. at 991 (Oakes, J., concurring).
267. Id. at 992 (Oakes, J., concurring); see Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783-84 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.) (Stew-
art, J.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
268. 568 F.2d at 992-95 (Oakes, J., concurring). The "New York Times malice" test was
rejected because: (a) the case was speaking only to the substantive standard, not to the
method of proving it; (b) permitting discovery not only has a chilling effect on the end
product, as was contemplated by New York Times, but also chills the relationship among
the editors; and c) the test gives no consideration to the ramifications of Tornillo for the
special status accorded the editorial process. Id. at 992-94. The "compromise" position takes
account of the mandates of Tornillo, but falls short of the level of protection required by New
York Times and Tornillo. Furthermore, the position was developed in a case where the
information sought was on the periphery, rather than at the center, of the editorial process.
Id. at 994-95; see Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
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Thus, Judge Oakes agreed with Chief Judge Kaufman that plaintiff
Herbert would have to prove the knowing or reckless falsity of the
statements by circumstantial evidence.
Purloining Judge Oakes's architectural metaphor, it might be
said that the Herbert majority has constructed a substantial edifice
on rather weak foundation. On the one hand, the Supreme Court
has not given such unquestioned protection to the news-gathering
and editorial processes as might be supposed from reading the pre-
vailing judges' opinions. The Court's comment that "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated" 2 was made in a case denying reporters a privilege from
disclosing confidential sources;2s° there is at present no such consti-
tutional privilege.21 The Supreme Court cases relied on as affording
protection to the editorial process both had substantial overtones of
governmental intrusion into news dissemination;22 they certainly
did not hold unequivocally that "the First Amendment will not
tolerate intrusion into the decision-making function of editors. ' '2s
More generally, the Supreme Court has been less than receptive to
special protection for the press as an institution. This point was
reinforced late in the Court's 1977 Term in Houchins v. KQED,
Inc.,24 when the majority, concurring (per Mr. Justice Stewart), and
dissenting opinions all reaffirmed that the institutional press was
entitled to no preferred first amendment position, at least regarding
access to information unavailable to the general public.25
U.S. 966 (1973); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958).
269. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972), quoted in Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d
at 977.
270. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (reporters required to testify before
grand juries regarding crime of which they have knowledge).
271. Id.; Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548-50 (2d Cir.) (Stewart, J.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 910 (1958). See also Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 966 (1973).
272. In both Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), and Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the
question was whether the government could require certain matter (replies to published
criticisms in the former case and paid political announcements in the latter) to be given
expression. The concern in both cases was that the possibility of a required response would
deter controversial expression, not that the editorial process itself had intrinsic value. See
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-57; Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 120-21.
273. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J., concurring); see id.
at 997 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
274. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
275. Id. at 9-12 (Burger, C.J.); id. at 16-17 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 25-30
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Whether pretrial discovery will have an impermissibly chilling
effect on "the editorial process" in fact involves two issues: first,
whether it will discourage the ultimate publication of "news," and
second, whether it will discourage communications within the news-
room. With respect to the first question, the "New York Times
malice" test seems, as Judge Meskill 'noted in his Herbert dissent, 276
to provide an adequate standard. That test was adopted with the
implicit recognition that not all expression is protected by the first
amendment,277 but also with the knowledge that there must be some
"breathing space" in which liability cannot be imposed, so that no
protected expression will be deterred. 8 In the present context, the
question becomes whether pretrial discovery will encroach on that
breathing space, i. e., whether an editor will be deterred from publi-
cation significantly more by a fear that he will be asked if he knew
or cared that the statement was false than he will be by the fear that
he will be held liable if he knew or did not care that it was false. It
seems highly unlikely that an editor's decision whether to publish
will turn on his knowledge that the prospective plaintiff will not be
permitted to prove New York Times malice by direct evidence.
Thus, the Herbert ban on pretrial discovery of the editor's motiva-
tions is an unnecessary extension of the New York Times protections
for free expression.29
On the other hand, pretrial discovery of matters other than the
subjective mental states of editors has a potential for deterring the"creative verbal testing, probing, and discussion of hypotheses and
alternatives"ss which goes on in a newsroom."' This chilling effect
goes beyond that contemplated by the New York Times decision, in
which the Court implicitly permitted some judicial inquiry through
libel actions into the editorial process. However, to avoid this chill-
ing effect would require a privilege covering all confidential commu-
nications, oral or written, made by newspeople in the newsroom or
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
276. See 568 F.2d at 995-96, 997-98 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
277. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1964); id. at 295 (Black,
J., concurring); id. at 299-300 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
278. See id. at 270-72, 278-79.
279. Compare the Tornillo and Democratic National Committee situations, discussed
supra note 272, where the proposed intrusion into the editorial process may well have effects
on what the editor ultimately chooses to publish.
280. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1977); see id. at 990 (Oakes, J.,
concurring); id. at 997 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 997 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
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elsewhere. As Judge Meskill observed, such a privilege goes beyond
any extended heretofore and seems unlikely to gain recognition from
a Supreme Court not notably receptive to new constitutional privi-
leges . 2
B. Trespass by Reporters
CBS was less successful with a first amendment defense it
raised in another case decided during this Survey year. Le Mistral,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System"' grew out of an unan-
nounced visit by a WCBS-TV reporter and camera crew to a well-
known restaurant which had been cited for health code violations.
After entering the restaurant with bright lights on and cameras
rolling, the reporter and camera crew were commanded to leave by
the restaurant's president. In a subsequent action for trespass, the
plaintiff was awarded compensatory and punitive damages by a
jury.u4 The trial judge upheld the jury's finding of trespass but set
aside the damage awards. 28
In reinstating the compensatory damage awards, the First De-
partment rejected CBS's claim that it was insulated from liability
by virtue of the first amendment: "Clearly, the First Amendment
is not a shibboleth before which all other rights must succumb."'1
Quoting the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Galella v.
Onassis,27 the court noted: "'Crimes and torts committed in news
gathering are not protected. . . . There is no threat to a free press
in requiring its agents to act within the law.' "2
The punitive damages question was remanded to allow CBS to
demonstrate and explain its motivation.2' Justice Murphy dis-
sented from the remand on the ground that the evidence indicated
merely that the defendant was "pursuing a newsworthy item in the
overly aggressive but good faith manner that characterizes the oper-
ation of the news media today. ' '210
282. Id. at 998.
283. 61 A.D.2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1st Dep't 1978).
284. Id. at 493, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 494, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
287. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
288. 61 A.D.2d at 494, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817 (quoting Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d at 995-
96) (citations omitted); see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972).
289. 61 A.D.2d at 495, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
290. Id. at 496, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 818 (Murphy, J., dissenting in part).
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C. Qualified Privileges
The principal decision in defamation and privacy law by the
New York Court of Appeals during this Survey year was Toker v.
Pollak."'1 The defendant in that case had allegedly defamed the
plaintiff, a prospective judicial appointee, in statements made to
the District Attorney, the New York City Department of Investiga-
tion, and the Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary. The defendant
argued that all the statements were absolutely privileged,2 2 but the
Court held that each was entitled only to a qualified privilege.2 3
The basis of the Court's holding was that the absolute immun-
ity for judicial proceedings "'applies only to a proceeding in court
or one before an officer having attributes similar to a court.' "2
Testimony before a grand jury has traditionally been given absolute
immunity from defamation liability."5 However, complaints to a
district attorney have not been accorded absolute immunity be-
cause they do not constitute or institute a judicial proceeding.2" In
Toker the Court held that the statements made in an affidavit for
the district attorney, even though they were in lieu of grand jury
testimony, were entitled only to a qualified privilege, 2 7 since that
"is sufficient to foster the public purpose of encouraging citizens to
come forth with information concerning criminal activity.""' 8 The
statements to the Department of Investigation were also given only
a qualified privilege, since proceedings before the department lack
all the safeguards (i.e., the opportunity for the person accused to
challenge the allegations) traditionally associated with a judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding.2" For the same reason, the communica-
291. 44 N.Y.2d 211, 376 N.E.2d 163, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1978).
292. Id. at 218, 376 N.E.2d at 166, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 219, 376 N.E.2d at 167, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 5 (quoting Pecue v. West, 233 N.Y.
316, 321, 135 N.E. 515, 516 (1922)).
295. Hastings v. Lusk, 22 Wend. 410, 417 (N.Y. 1839); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToTS
§ 589, Comment f (1977).
296. Pecue v. West, 233 N.Y. 316, 322, 135 N.E. 515, 517 (1922).
297. 44 N.Y.2d at 220-21, 376 N.E.2d at 167-68, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 6. The Court distin-
guished grand jury testimony from communications to a prosecutor on the ground that the
grand jury proceedings are made secret by statute, N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAw § 190.25(4) (McKin-
ney 1971). 44 N.Y.2d at 220-21, 376 N.E.2d at 167-68, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 6. As Judge Wachtler
noted in dissent, however, grand jury testimony is not absolutely privileged because the
proceedings are secret; rather, both the privilege and the secrecy are based on the policy of
encouraging truth and candor in a proceeding that plays a critical role in the administration
of justice. Id. at 224, 376 N.E.2d at 169-70, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
298. 44 N.Y.2d at 221, 376 N.E.2d at 168, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
299. Id. at 221-23, 376 N.E.2d at 168-69, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 6-7.
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tions to the Mayor's Committee had only a qualified, not an abso-
lute, privilege.3 ®
Judge Wachtler dissented on the ground that all the statements
were entitled to an absolute privilege. In his view, "selection of
honest Judges is a matter of paramount public interest. . . .Thus
persons having information concerning the character of potential
judicial candidates should be encouraged to make full and candid
disclosure to those charged with the responsibility of determining
fitness for judicial office.""'' In addition, he would agree with Dean
Prosser that "'the better rule seems to be that an informal com-
plaint to a prosecuting attorney or a magistrate is to be regarded as
an initial step in a judicial proceeding, and so entitled to an abso-
lute, rather than a qualified immunity.' "3102 In a case such as this,
where the statements alleged a bribe that "did not only involve a
possible criminal act, but corruption by a public employee, seeking
a higher office, . . . the public need to prosecute or bar from a
position of public trust far outweighs the possibility of harassment
of the innocent. ''1 3
VI. MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY: CIvMI RIGHTS SUITS
In a decision 4 which could have the most wide-ranging effect
of any rendered during this Survey year,0 5 the United States Su-
300. Id. at 223, 376 N.E.2d at 169, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
301. Id. at 223, 376 N.E.2d at 169, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 224-25, 376 N.E.2d at 170, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (Wachtler, J., dissenting)
(quoting W. PRossz, supra note 29, § 114, at 781).
303. Id. at 225, 376 N.E.2d at 170, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
304. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
305. In addition to Monell, mention should also be made of three cases dealing with the
duty of care owed by a municipality. In Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763,
404 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978), the Court of Appeals held the City of New York liable for negligently
omitting to provide a substitute for an absent school crossing guard, since the city had
voluntarily assumed a particular duty to a special class of persons who had relied upon the
city. Id. at 195-97, 375 N.E.2d at 766-67, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 587-88; see Riss v. City of New York,
22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968); Schuster v. City of New York, 5
N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). In Dutton v. City of Olean, 60 A.D.2d
335, 401 N.Y.S.2d 118 (4th Dep't 1978), by contrast, no liability was imposed after the
plaintiff was hit by a sniper's bullet, because there was no evidence the police had acted
affirmatively and led the plaintiff into the zone of danger; therefore, they had breached no
special duty to protect him. Id. at 338-39, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 120-21. Finally, in DeWitt Proper-
ties, Inc. v. City of New York, 44 N.Y.2d 417, 377 N.E.2d 461, 406 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1978), the
Court of Appeals held that it was improper to impose liability on the city for a water-main
break on the basis of res ipsa loquitor, since the city's duty to maintain its water mains does
not require it to unearth and inspect them unless there is some warning of a possible defect.
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preme Court held that municipalities were "persons" subject to
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.111 The Court's decision, overruling
a seventeen-year-old precedent, poses a serious threat that the cur-
rent torrent of section 1983 suits3' will become a flood devastating
municipal treasuries.
Monell v. Department of Social Services3° was an action
brought by female employees of the Department of Social Services
and the Board of Education to challenge policies of those bodies that
compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence
before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief and back pay from the city, the department,
and the board, as well as from the mayor, the Commissioner of the
Department of Social Services and the Chancellor of the Board of
Education in their official capacities.3 9
The district court denied injunctive relief on the ground that a
change in maternity leave policies after institution of the action
made such claims moot.310 With regard to the back pay claims, the
court determined that the challenged policies were unconstitu-
tional.31 However, it denied relief on the ground that, since any
damages would ultimately be paid by the city, no recovery could be
given in light of the immunity conferred on municipalities by
Monroe v. Pape.32 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.31 3
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that municipalities had
no absolute immunity from claims made under section 1983 for
Id. at 424, 377 N.E.2d at 464, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 20. Thus, in the absence of any proof of actual
negligence by the city, there was no basis for holding it liable.
306. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
In another case decided during this Survey year, the Court held that the damages recoverable
under section 1983 (aside from a nominal award) depend upon proof of an actual injury
incurred as a result of the deprivation of constitutional rights. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 237
(1978).
307. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 734 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
308. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
309. Id. at 661.
310. 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
311. Id. at 855.
312. Id.; see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
313. 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976).
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deprivation of constitutional rights. The Court overruled Monroe
v. Pape, insofar as that case held that local governments were abso-
lutely immune from suits under section 1983, on the basis of "[a]
fresh analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and particu-
larly of the case law which each side mustered in its support
. . " 5 Essentially, that analysis showed that Congress had re-
jected the "Sherman amendment" '316 to the Act because the amend-
ment would have made municipalities liable for the riotous acts of
private persons; the Court had erred in Monroe by inferring from
this rejection an intention that municipalities be immune as well
from liability for conduct pursuant to official policy.3 17 The amend-
ment was rejected because it imposed an obligation to keep the
peace on municipalities, which in many cases had no such obliga-
tion under state law." 8 On the other hand, numerous cases prior to
1871 had upheld the power of federal courts to enforce the Constitu-
tion against municipalities that violated it,319 so no new obligation
was being imposed by the section of the Civil Rights Act which
became section 1983. Given the broadly remedial purposes of the
statute320 and the usual inclusion of "bodies politic and corporate"
within the meaning of the word "person" under contemporary case
law and statutes, 32' the Monell Court found that section 1983 was
intended to cover municipalities.322
314. 436 U.S. at 700-01.
315. Id. at 665.
316. The amendment would have made "the inhabitants of the county, city, or parish"
in which certain acts of violence occurred liable "to pay full compensation" to the person
damaged or his widow or legal representative. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871);
see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 702-03 app. (1978); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 188 & n.38 (1961). The Sherman amendment was proposed as section 7 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1976));
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the codification of section 1 of that Act. Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. at 665.
317. See 436 U.S. at 664-83.
318. See id. at 668.
319. Id. at 672-83.
320. Id. at 683-86.
321. Id. at 688-89; see Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. But see 1 U.S.C. §
1 (1976).
322. 436 U.S. at 688-89. Mr. Justice Powell concurred, adding, inter alia, the observation
that the Court's decision obviated the necessity to decide whether a cause of action against
municipalities might be inferred directly from the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 713-14
(Powell, J., concurring). It was ironic that on the day before Monell was announced, the
Second Circuit held, in a five-to-four decision, that a municipality could be sued for damages
directly under the fourteenth amendment for employee actions that had been "authorized,
sanctioned, or ratified" at a "policy-making level." Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.
1978).
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice dissented from the
Court's decision on the ground that the Monroe holding had been
reaffirmed by a long and consistent line of precedents and had given
rise to legitimate expectations by municipalities23s In their view,
only Congress, and not the Court, is equipped to foresee the practi-
cal consequences of a change such as that made by the majority's
decision.324 However, the majority disputed both the length and the
consistency of the precedents, noting that Monroe had been a depar-
ture from prior practice, 315 and that numerous post-Monroe cases
had made school boards liable under section 1983.321 Moreover, the
majority rejected the argument that reliance based on Monroe was
justifiable:
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in Monroe, "[tihis is not an area
of commercial law in which, presumably, individuals may have ar-
ranged their affairs in reliance on the expected stability of deci-
sion." . . .Indeed, municipalities simply cannot "arrange their
affairs" on an assumption that they can violate constitutional rights
indefinitely since injunctive suits against local officials under § 1983
would prohibit any such arrangement. And it scarcely need be men-
tioned that nothing in Monroe encourages municipalities to violate
constitutional rights or even suggests that such violations are any-
thing other than completely wrong.328
Although Monell has the potential for making municipal treas-
uries into a "pot of gold" in the already staggering number of civil
rights suits,312 the practical effect of the decision is difficult to fore-
tell. For one thing, municipalities have already been paying some
section 1983 judgments indirectly under indemnification provisions
afforded their employees .3  Another factor that perhaps mitigates
Monell's effect is its ruling that a municipality cannot be held liable
323. 436 U.S. at 714-16, 724 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 724 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 695; see, e.g., Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), vacating per
curiam 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 161 (1943).
326. 436 U.S. at 663 & n.5, 696.
327. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 221-22 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
328. 436 U.S. at 699-700.
329. Civil rights cases commenced in the district courts increased from 296 in 1961,
[19761 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JuD. CONF. OF THE U.S.: ANN. REPORT OF THE DIR.
OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS Table 17, at 173, to 13,113 in 1977, [1977] REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JuD. CONF. OF THE U.S.: ANN. REPORT OF THE DIR. OF THE ADMIN.
OFFCE OF THE U.S. CoumRS Table 11, at 189.
330. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 713 n.9 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring); see N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw §§ 50-j(4), 50-k(2), 50-m(2) (McKinney 1977).
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solely on a respondeat superior theory." ' The Court held that a
municipality did not" 'subject, or cause to be subjected'" any per-
son to the deprivation of his constitutional rights unless the depriva-
tion represented official policy."' Finally, the Court suggested the
possibility that some limited official immunity might be available
to municipalities. 3 3
However, the net effect of the Monell decision is likely to be
increased pressure on municipal budgets. Juries, no longer inhibited
by the prospect of financially ruining individual officials, will pro-
vide vindication for the deprivation of constitutional rights at conse-
quently higher levels out of the "deep pocket" now made available.
Taken together with expanding definitions of the constitutional
rights protected by section 1983,3m and the incentives to litigation
provided by the 1976 amendment that allows attorney's fees as costs
in civil rights litigation,m this decision poses a real problem for local
governments already squeezed between declining revenues and in-
creased expenses.3 36
331. 436 U.S. at 691-95. Mr. Justice Stevens, who concurred in the result, did not join
in this part of the Court's opinion. Id. at 714 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court had not
reached the vicarious liability question in Monroe. 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961). But see Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 663-64.
332. 436 U.S. at 691-92 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)).
333. Id. at 694-95. Mr. Justice Stevens, who concurred in the result, did not join in this
part of the opinion. Id. at 714 (Stevens, J., concurring).
In another decision this Survey year, the Supreme Court held that prison officials would
be liable for civil rights violations only if "they knew or reasonably should have known," or
acted with the "malicious intention" that their actions would cause a deprivation of rights.
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-66 (1978); see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
322 (1978). Giving qualified immunity to these officials, after previously extending it to, inter
alia, a state governor, local school board members, and prosecutors (e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 418-19 (1976) (prosecutors); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (school
board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (state governor, president of
state university, officers and members of state national guard); see O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (superintendent of state hospital)), "strongly implies" to the dissent-
ing Justice Stevens "that every defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to assert a qualified
immunity from damage liability." Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 568 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
334. Monell v. Department of Social Serva., 436 U.S. 658, 734 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
335. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
336. See Richland, Century-Old Rights Statute Could Be Fee Boon to Bar, 180 N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 17, 1978, at 1, col. 3-4.
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